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INTRODUCTION 
The rule that charitable organizations may not “participate in, or 
intervene in . . . any political campaign”1 is hardly a secret. Since its 
introduction as part of the Internal Revenue Code in 1954, section 
501(c)(3)’s “Political Activities Prohibition,”2 as it is often called, has 
been the subject of considerable scholarly debate, practical concern, 
                                                                                                                 
1 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). For convenience, the term “charitable organizations” is used 
here to refer to any of the organization types described in section 501(c)(3), including 
educational, religious, scientific, and literary.  
2 See, e.g., David A. Wimmer, Curtailing the Political Influence of Section 501(c)(3) 
Tax-Exempt Machines, 11 VA. TAX REV. 605, 622 (1992) (calling section 501(c)(3)’s rule that 
charitable organizations cannot participate in political campaigns the “Political Activities 
Prohibition”). 
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and occasional political wrangling. Although the contours of the rule 
may be imprecise, and enforcement by the IRS uneven—resulting in 
frustration for some—arguably the rule has stood the test of time. 
Like it or not, understand it or not, it is an embedded characteristic of 
the charitable sector that charity and political activity are by law 
incompatible.  
As a practical matter, the “Political Activities Prohibition” or 
“Rule” means that charities may not become partisan, or agents of 
propaganda.
3
 The Rule keeps charitable institutions outside of the 
political sphere. Charities are allowed a voice on issues, but may not 
become political actors or unbalanced purveyors of opinion. Of 
course, as Aristotle said long ago, “man is by nature a political 
animal.”4 Thus, a rule that keeps associations of persons from 
speaking politically is bound to bump up against primal forces from 
time to time—and so it has proved. But, despite occasional pressure 
on the Rule, there has been little realistic chance of reversing this 
defining characteristic of the charitable “independent” sector by 
Congress or the courts. 
One reason the Rule has lasted is that, by and large, it has been 
uncontroversial. There have been some loud voices raised in 
resistance, but little concrete action.
5
 Another reason the Rule has 
survived may be because, to a certain extent, it was redundant. Absent 
the Rule, charities still would have faced a prohibition on some of 
their political activities under campaign finance laws, which, until 
recently, had long provided that corporations, including charitable 
corporations, could not spend money expressly advocating for or 
against a candidate for public office.
6
 Accordingly, for the most 
political of speech, charities faced both a tax law restriction and a 
campaign finance law restriction. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission,
7
 however, changed the legal landscape. 
Citizens United held that the campaign finance rule prohibiting 
corporate expenditures for express advocacy
8
 (or its functional 
                                                                                                                 
3 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  
4 ARISTOLE, POLITICS AND POETICS 5 (Compass Books ed., Benjamin Jowett & Thomas 
Twining trans., The Viking Press 1957) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
5 See infra Part I.C for a discussion of criticisms of the Rule. 
6 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80–101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 
159 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. I 1947)) (repealed 1948). 
7 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
8 Express advocacy means to use “express terms [that] advocate the election or defeat of 
a clearly identified candidate for federal office,” such as “‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your 
ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ [or] ‘reject.’” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).  
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equivalent) is an unconstitutional burden on free speech under the 
First Amendment.
9
 Accordingly, the tax rule now stands alone, 
prohibiting not only express advocacy by charitable corporations, but 
also other forms of political speech as defined by the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”).10 A challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Political Activities Prohibition thus seems inevitable.
11
 Can the 
prohibition survive Citizens United? Should it? These are the 
questions addressed in this Article.
12
  
Part I surveys the history of the political activities prohibition, 
emphasizing that it was not a reactionary policy, but quite considered 
and is supported by strong state interests. Part II analyzes Citizens 
United in detail. It argues that if the Supreme Court reviews the 
Political Activities Prohibition, Citizens United is distinguishable, and 
that the Political Activities Prohibition, unlike the campaign finance 
rule, is not a burden on speech and, therefore, is constitutional. Part 
III discusses cautionary notes to Part II’s analysis, and explains that 
even if the Political Activities Prohibition is constitutionally 
defective, the important limitation on the charitable deduction 
nonetheless would survive. Regardless of the constitutionality of the 
Political Activities Prohibition, Part IV outlines and examines 
alternatives to present law, considering practical, legal, and 
administrative concerns with a regime that allows some political 
activity by charitable organizations. This Part concludes that the 
Political Activities Prohibition is the best option, in part because 
alternatives would dilute the meaning of charity and prove even more 
difficult to administer than present law.  
As a side note, although the thrust of this Article is about the 
Political Activities Prohibition of section 501(c)(3), the prohibition 
cannot be viewed in isolation. It is closely connected to section 
501(c)(3)’s lobbying limitation13 and also to provisions of the Internal 
                                                                                                                 
9 130 S. Ct. at 886. 
10 See infra note 80 and accompanying text for a description of the type of activity 
generally covered by the Rule. 
11 One such challenge has been made, but faltered. See, e.g., Catholic Answers, Inc. v. 
United States, 09–CV–670–IEG (AJB), 2009 WL 3320498, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009), 
aff’d, 09–56926, 2011 WL 2452177 (9th Cir. June 21, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s request for a 
declaration that treasury regulations apply only to activities that constitute express advocacy), 
cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3440 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012) (No. 11–511). 
12 See also Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and 
Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 873–74 (2011) (arguing that the Political Activities Prohibition is 
not likely to be held to be an unconstitutional burden). This Article generally agrees with 
Professor Galston’s conclusion, but takes a different and supplementary approach. 
13 An organization is not recognized under section 501(c)(3) unless “no substantial part of 
the activities of [the organization] is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to 
influence legislation.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
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Revenue Code (the “Code”)14 that disallow ordinary and necessary 
business expense deductions for lobbying and political activity,
15
 
disallow charitable contribution deductions for contributions to an 
organization that engages in political activity or substantial 
lobbying,
16
 and provide for the tax treatment of political 
organizations.
17
 Although full exploration of the history and relevance 
of these important provisions is beyond this Article’s scope,18 much 
of the discussion is relevant not just to the political activity of section 
501(c)(3) organizations, but to the political and lobbying activity of 
tax-exempt organizations more broadly. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF A NOBLE RULE 
From the original federal income tax exemption for charitable 
organizations in 1913
19
 to the present, the term “political activity” has 
given rise to considerable confusion. Today, the term refers to activity 
covered by the Political Activities Prohibition of section 501(c)(3) 
and is distinguished from another subset of activity related to politics, 
namely lobbying, which carries its own separate limitation.
20
 
Although we now readily distinguish between the two, historically the 
term “political activity” did not have the same technical meaning.21 
Rather, references to political activity often included both lobbying 
and campaign activity, as if the two types were part of the same topic 
of concern.
22
 This is important because arguably, an unanswered 
question in 1913 was what sort of “political activity,” broadly 
                                                                                                                 
14 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the “Code” are to the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended. 
15 I.R.C. § 162(e). 
16 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). 
17 I.R.C. § 527. 
18 For a discussion of the effect of Citizens United on the lobbying limitation, see Lloyd 
Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 
ELECTION L.J. 407, 415 (2011) (arguing “it is highly unlikely that the Citizens United decision 
throws the existing federal tax law limits on lobbying by charities into immediate doubt”). For a 
discussion of the effect of Citizens United on non-charitable exempt organizations, see Ellen P. 
Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens 
United 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 391 (2011) (reviewing questions raised by Citizens United 
regarding “limits and burdens” on noncharitable tax-exempt organizations’ political speech). 
19 The Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63–16 § II(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172. 
20 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the lobbying limitation). 
21 See, e.g., Elias Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the 
Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439, 444 (1960) (writing about “political activity,” to mean 
what today we refer to as lobbying activity, and distinguishing it from campaign activity). Also, 
early references to “political activity” in legislative history were broad and included lobbying. 
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 18 (1954) (concluding that the laws regulating the 
“political activity” of charitable organizations, including lobbying and political activity, were 
not sufficient).  
22 H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 95 (discussing the lobbying prohibition but using the term 
political activity). 
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construed, was consistent with charitable tax status. In part, the 
statutory history of political activity and charity is a response to this 
question, one that fashioned distinct legal categories to limit and 
describe specific types of “political activity.”  
A. A Brief History of the Prohibition: A Noncontroversial Rule 
Senator Lyndon Johnson famously inserted the Political Activities 
Prohibition as a Senate floor amendment to legislation that became 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
23
 There is no direct legislative 
history to the provision explaining Congress’s reasoning.24 The 
Rule’s abrupt passage leads many to conclude that its rationale was 
mostly political: Senator Johnson was attacked by a charity during his 
reelection campaign and used the power of his office to change the 
law to prohibit such attacks.
25
 And there is little doubt that Johnson 
pushed the Rule through in the heat of a political battle. Indeed, after 
a thorough review of the legislative record, one commentator 
concluded that “Johnson saw a cabal of national conservative forces, 
led by tax-exempt educational entities fueled by corporate donations, 
arrayed against him and wanted to put a stop to the meddling of these 
                                                                                                                 
23 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954). 
24 The direct legislative history is succinct. Senator Johnson explained to the Senate:  
Mr. President, this amendment seeks to extend the provisions of section 501 of the 
House bill, denying tax-exempt status to not only those people who influence 
legislation but also to those who intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any 
candidate for any public office. I have discussed the matter with the chairman of the 
committee, the minority ranking member of the committee, and several other 
members of the committee, and I understand that the amendment is acceptable to 
them. I hope the chairman will take it to conference, and that it will be included in 
the final bill which Congress passes. 
Id. 
25 See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 603 (10th ed. 
2011) (“[Senator Johnson] offered the amendment out of concern that funds provided by a 
charitable foundation were being used to help finance the campaign of an opponent in a primary 
election.”); JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS 261 (2d ed. 2006) (internal citation omitted) (“The conventional wisdom is 
that Senator Johnson was out to curb the activities of a Texas foundation which had provided 
indirect financial support to his opponent in a senatorial primary election campaign.”); Oliver A. 
Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Politics by Charitable 
Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 24 
(2003) (“Commentators have explained that Senator Johnson was motivated by the activities of 
charities allied to his opponent in a recent campaign.”); Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored in 
the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by 
Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733, 768 (2001) (noting that Johnson wanted to prohibit certain tax-
exempt entities from intervening in political campaigns, in part, because he “wanted to stomp 
out a potential threat in his own back yard”). 
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foreign interlopers.”26 Enactment of the Political Activities 
Prohibition was his weapon of choice. 
Notwithstanding the circumstances of the Rule’s enactment, 
however, the broader historical record offers a more compelling story 
of the origin of the Rule than the reaction of a single skillful Senator 
to a political problem. Although the absence of direct legislative 
history is accurate, a view often implicit (and sometimes explicit) in 
some discussions of the Rule
27
 is that, in part because of the abrupt 
fashion in which the Rule was enacted, the rationale is uncertain, and 
we are, for the most part, supplying reasons for Congress’ actions 
after the fact. Importantly, here, the implication may be that the Rule 
was adopted ad hoc, and therefore should be changed, or if not 
changed, perhaps treated with less reverence than a more fully 
reasoned rule.  
Although this is an important objection to the Rule, it overstates 
the significance of both the barren legislative history and Johnson’s 
self-interest. Legislators often act with selfish motives and 
consistently fail fully to explain their actions for the record. But such 
facts do not necessarily undermine a law’s broader purposes or intent. 
In the case of the Political Activities Prohibition, for example, the 
question of charity and politics did not arise suddenly in the summer 
                                                                                                                 
26 O’Daniel, supra note 25, at 768.  
27 See, e.g., NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: 
PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 116 (2011) (footnote omitted) (“The politically 
expedient and partisan impetuses for the proscription on political campaign speech were perhaps 
a significant reason that Congress never clearly articulated a comprehensive, broadly acceptable 
rationale as to why the statutory ban was ‘sound tax policy.’ That gap left it ripe for 
academicians later to justify the gag rule. Their arguments necessarily are after-the-fact 
rationalizations and speculations, largely based on asserted public policy grounds, more than 
rationales supported by legislative history.”); John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The 
Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 267, 285–86 
(Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“It is generally agreed that no 
cogent, consistent rationale for the various restrictions on political activity found in §501(c)(3) 
and related provisions can be unearthed in the legislative record of their enactment. Rather, the 
constraints were adopted piecemeal, often with little discussion, and, in the case of the 
campaigning ban, as an apparently ad hoc response to a perceived affront to the lawmakers who 
sponsored the bill.”); Keith S. Blair, Praying for a Tax Break: Churches, Political Speech, and 
the Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 405, 413 (2009) (citing 
briefly the “little legislative history” and the “generally accepted” facts that led Johnson to 
introduce the amendment); Siri Mielke Buller, Lobbying and Political Restrictions on § 
501(c)(3) Organizations: A Guide for Compliance in the Wake of Increased IRS Examination, 
52 S.D. L. REV. 136, 143 (2007) (discussing briefly that the 1954 amendment restricting 
political activity was Johnson’s doing and that it remains in the current code); Houck, supra 
note 25, at 81 (“The Internal Revenue Code restraints on the political activities of charities have 
been in evolution, and in dispute, for nearly a century. They represent no grand plan, but rather a 
design arrived at in pieces by the impulses of the moment. They have been looking for a reason 
since the time they first appeared, and it was half a century before Congress even attempted one. 
Reading their histories, one is struck by the fact that each of the limitations, in a different 
climate, could have come out quite differently.”).  
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of 1954. Rather, it was an issue that had dogged charitable tax status 
from the inception of the federal income tax exemption for charitable 
organizations.  
From the beginning in 1913, there was considerable uncertainty 
about the relationship of charity to political activity as reflected in the 
common law of charitable trusts. As Professor Houck explains, “By 
the early twentieth century . . . the English rule [on political activity] 
and its applications had evolved to the point where political activity—
legislative or electoral, exclusive or ancillary—was fatal [to charitable 
status].”28 Houck also notes, however, that the majority American rule 
diverged from the English approach to embrace the use of political 
means to secure charitable ends.
29
 Likewise, Professor Chisolm, 
discussing the common law of trusts, concluded that:  
[w]hat can be derived from the cases is the principle that at 
common law, political purposes are not charitable purposes; 
what the cases do not necessarily establish is that the use of 
political means (even arguably partisan political means) to 
achieve a charitable end nullifies the charitable character of 
that end at common law.
30
  
Uncertainty about the relationship of political activity and charity 
did not take long. In 1917, Congress provided for a deduction from 
federal income taxes for contributions to charitable organizations.
31
 In 
order to determine which organizations were eligible to receive 
charitable contributions, the Treasury adopted a regulation in 1919 
providing that “associations formed to disseminate controversial or 
partisan propaganda are not educational within the meaning of the 
statute.”32 Although the basis for the regulation is unclear,33 it shows 
that the Treasury was skeptical from the beginning that partisan 
propaganda could be charitable activity, despite the absence of any 
formal restriction in the statute.  
                                                                                                                 
28 Houck, supra note 25, at 5.  
29 Id. at 7–8. 
30 Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 346 (1990); see also Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the 
IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. 
L. REV. 217, 252–53 (1992) (arguing that campaign intervention that furthers the organization’s 
mission is consistent with the common law on charitable trusts). 
31 War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65–50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). 
32 T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 285 (1919). 
33 Houck, supra note 25, at 9. Houck described the early interpretive rulings of the 
Treasury as initially recognizing political ends as charitable before changing course and 
deciding that “[p]ropaganda is that which propagates the tenets or principles of a particular 
doctrine by zealous dissemination” and thus was not for the public benefit. Id. at 10 (quotations 
and citations omitted). Subsequent decisions struggled to maintain the propaganda-educational 
distinction. Id. at 10–12 
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The distrust was not limited to the executive branch. In Slee v. 
Commissioner,
34
 Judge Learned Hand ruled that an organization 
formed to provide information about birth control acted contrary to its 
charitable tax exemption when it lobbied to change the birth control 
laws.
35
 Judge Hand famously held that “[p]olitical agitation as such is 
outside the statute, however innocent the aim.”36 
Inevitably, Congress was drawn into the debate. In 1934, Congress 
drew an initial line in the Code by requiring that “no substantial part” 
of a charitable organization’s activities could be “carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.”37 This 
lobbying limitation was prompted by a charity’s high profile 
opposition to the New Deal legislation.
38
 Accordingly, the response 
ultimately enacted was directed to legislative and not campaign 
activity. Congress was aware, however, of the distinction between the 
two subsets of “political activity.” While debating the lobbying limit, 
the Senate in 1934 initially passed language similar to the later 
Johnson Amendment: to wit, that no “substantial part” of a charity’s 
activities may be “participation in partisan politics.”39 Congress as a 
whole, however, considered the Senate language too broad and struck 
it in conference.
40
 Thus, the 1934 legislation severely limited one type 
of political activity—lobbying—but left open for another day the 
issue of campaign intervention. That other day came twenty years 
                                                                                                                 
34 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930). 
35 Id. at 186. 
36 Id. at 185. Professor Houck described the cases that followed Slee as limiting its reach. 
Houck, supra note 25, at 14–15. 
37 26 U.S.C. § 103(6) (1934) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006)); see 
HOPKINS, supra note 25, at 578–79 for a description of the sparse legislative history of the 1934 
legislation, which was also a floor amendment. 
38 See Houck, supra note 25, at 16–23 (explaining how the National Economy League 
urged President Hoover to oppose increased government spending on veterans’ benefits). 
39 S. REP. NO. 73–558, at 26 (1934). 
40 See H.R. REP. NO. 73–1385, at 3–4 (1934) (Conf. Rep.) (showing the House and Senate 
agreeing to more limited language: “no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation”). Representative Samuel B. Hill 
explained:  
The Senate denied a deduction for contributions made to certain organizations, a 
substantial part of the activities of which was participation in partisan politics or 
carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. We were 
afraid this provision was too broad, and we succeeded in getting the Senate conferees 
to eliminate organizations, a substantial part of the activities of which was 
participation in partisan politics.  
78 CONG. REC. 7729, 7831 (1934); see also Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, 
Election Year Issues, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 335, 336 (2001), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf (“The provision . . . was deleted in conference, 
so that only the lobbying restriction remained.”). 
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later via the Johnson Amendment, in which Congress returned to the 
1934 Senate language (except without an allowance for insubstantial 
political activity).
41
 The Johnson Amendment, to a certain extent, 
marked a continuation or culmination—at a glacial legislative pace—
of the discussion about politics and charity.  
As chronicled by Professor Ann Murphy, Congress’s enactment of 
the Johnson Amendment is best understood not by the relative 
absence of direct legislative history, but rather in the context of wider 
events,
42
 including the historical tension that had been ongoing in the 
Treasury, the courts, and the legislature since early in the century.  
For example, prior to enactment of the Johnson Amendment,
43
 
Congress had been holding extensive public hearings that investigated 
the political activities of charitable organizations. In 1952, the House 
of Representatives formed a special committee to investigate tax-
exempt foundations and other charities,
44
 known as the “Cox 
Committee.”45 Specifically, the committee was charged with 
determining: 
which . . . foundations . . . are using their resources for 
purposes other than the purposes for which they were 
established, and especially to determine which . . . 
foundations . . . are using their resources for un-American and 
subversive activities or for purposes not in the interest or 
tradition of the United States.
46
  
Then, a new committee (the “Reece Committee”) was formed to 
continue the work of the Cox Committee.
47
 The Reece Committee 
was charged with essentially the same task as the Cox Committee. It 
was to: 
                                                                                                                 
41 There is evidence that Johnson’s staff was aware of the history of the 1934 amendment. 
O’Daniel, supra note 25, at 764–65. The history was described in the statement by the IRS 
before the Reece Committee, which appeared in Johnson’s files with handwritten transcriptions, 
“presumably made by a Johnson staffer.” Id. at 765. 
42 Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate-Never the Twain Shall 
Meet?, 1 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 35, 53 (2003) (footnote omitted) (“[W]hen Senator Johnson 
proposed his amendment . . . it is not surprising that it was adopted verbatim without hearings or 
testimony. Both sides of the political fence were disturbed by the potential of non-profit groups 
to wield political power.”). 
43 Johnson first became involved in the issue because of a letter he received on May 27, 
1954, and proposed his Amendment on the Senate floor on July 2, 1954. O’Daniel, supra note 
25, at 760–65.  
44 H.R. Res. 561, 82d Cong., 98 Cong. Rec. 3489 (1952) (enacted). 
45 H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 1 (1954). 
46 H.R. Res. 561, 82d Cong., 98 Cong. Rec. 3489 (1952) (enacted). 
47 H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 1 (1954). 
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conduct a full and complete investigation and study of 
educational and philanthropic foundations and other 
comparable organizations which are exempt from Federal 
income taxation to determine if any foundations and 
organizations are using their resources for purposes other 
than the purposes for which they were established, and 
especially to determine which such foundations and 
organizations are using their resources for un-American and 
subversive activities; for political purposes; propaganda, or 
attempts to influence legislation.
48
 
The Reece Committee held sixteen hearings,
49
 the last of which 
occurred the day Senator Johnson first proposed his political activities 
amendment.
50
 In its final written report, the Reece Committee 
concluded that:  
It is the opinion of this Committee that the wording of the tax 
law regarding the prohibition of political activity should be 
carefully re-examined. We recognize that it is extremely 
difficult to draw the line between what should be permissible 
and what should not. Nevertheless, the present rule, as 
interpreted by the courts, permits far too much license. While 
further study may be indicated, we are inclined to support the 
suggestion that the limiting conditions of the present statute 
be dropped—those which restrict to the prohibition of 
political activity “to influence legislation” and those which 
condemn only if a “substantial” part of the foundation’s 
funds are so used. These restrictions make the entire 
prohibition meaningless. We advocate the complete exclusion 
of political activity, leaving it to the courts to apply the 
maxim of de minimis no curat lex. Carefully devised 
exceptions to this general prohibition against political activity 
might be made in the case of certain special types of 
organizations, such as bar associations.
51
  
The excerpt is revealing. It is a critique of the prevailing “prohibition 
on political activity,”52 which at the time53 included only the lobbying 
                                                                                                                 
48 Id. (emphasis added). 
49 Id. at 2. 
50 O’Daniel, supra note 25, at 765. 
51 H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 219 (first, second, and fifth instances of emphasis added). 
52 Id. 
53 The Committee’s final report was released in December 1954, after passage of the 
Johnson Amendment, though apparently without taking it into account. Id. This could be 
ignorance of the new rule or it could be implicit support for it. It also could be that the report 
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limit. In effect, the Reece Committee was saying that the then present 
rule did not go nearly far enough and urged changes to eliminate two 
loopholes. The first loophole was that the restriction covered only 
lobbying. Therefore, the Reece Committee said, the provision should 
be broadened in scope to cover all political activity, i.e., the language 
restricting the “prohibition” to activities “to influence legislation” 
should be “dropped.”54 The second loophole was that the law 
permitted insubstantial lobbying. This too the Reece Committee said 
should be changed, by eliminating the “substantial part” language.55 
These two loopholes, the Reece Committee said, “make the entire 
prohibition meaningless.”56 And so after months of hearings and 
agitation, the Reece Committee expressed the exact verdict reached 
by Senator Johnson, and, in turn, Congress: that politics and charity 
are incompatible.  
So although the direct legislative record of the Political Activities 
Prohibition is sparse, the political and historical context that gave rise 
to enactment of the rule largely supports its adoption.
57
 The two years 
prior to the Rule’s enactment were notable for distrust of foundations 
and other charitable organizations and concern over their “political” 
involvement, broadly construed. Looking back to earlier in the 
century, the historical experience of charity and politics was 
characterized by suspicion and gradual retrenchment. Shortly after 
enactment of the income tax exemption and the charitable deduction, 
the Treasury Department and the courts both expressed doubt 
regarding the compatibility of charity and politics, and eventually, 
Congress followed suit.
58
 Rather than being an ad hoc overreaction to 
one man’s political problem, the Rule is more fairly characterized as 
the product of debate occurring over decades (if not longer).
59
 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                 
 
was drafted mostly before enactment of the Rule but published afterward. In any case, there is 
little question but that the climate of the time was in favor of restrictions on the “political 
activity” of charitable organizations. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (discussing 
the circumstances surrounding the Johnson Amendment). 
54 H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 219. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See supra note 42 (noting that the climate supported the Johnson Amendment). 
58 See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text (discussing the progression of attitudes). 
59 Of course, there were and are questions about precisely what conduct was covered or 
intended to be covered by the legislative language of 1934 and of 1954. See Houck, supra note 
25, at 43 (noting a circuit court’s failure to provide a citation supporting its elucidation of the 
purposes of the 1934 and 1954 amendments and asserting that “given the legislative history of 
the . . . amendments, it would have been hard-pressed to do so”). But this does not obscure the 
central point that it is best to view the Johnson Amendment as a culmination of much that had 
preceded it. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that the climate supported the 
Johnson Amendment). 
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the ease of passage and subsequent lack of controversy regarding the 
Rule support the idea that by the time of its enactment it was a 
relatively uncontroversial proposition that charities should not be 
allowed to engage in political activity, broadly defined.  
B. Legislative Developments after Enactment 
The Political Activities Prohibition has been strengthened and 
reaffirmed by Congress over time. Congress revisited the subject of 
political activity and charity in 1969 and 1987, each time 
substantiating the thrust of the Rule. In the landmark Tax Reform Act 
of 1969,
60
 Congress codified the distinction between public charity 
and private foundation, and subjected private foundations to a distinct 
anti-abuse regime.
61
 Included in the new rules was an excise tax on 
the political (and lobbying) activities of private foundations, which 
applied in addition to the loss of tax-exempt status.
62
 Also in 1969, 
Congress completed the work of the Johnson Amendment by 
codifying a 1958 Treasury regulation,
63
 which had provided that no 
charitable deduction is allowed for contributions to organizations that 
violate the Political Activities Prohibition of section 501(c)(3).
64
 It is 
significant both that the Department of Treasury, on its own authority, 
adopted this gap-filling rule in 1958, and that Congress reaffirmed it 
in the statute with little-to-no fanfare over a decade later.
65
 
The 1987 legislation was the outcome of oversight hearings 
chaired by Congressman J.J. Pickle, Chairman of the House Ways 
and Means Subcommittee on Oversight.
66
 During the hearings, the 
Political Activities Prohibition was strongly supported by the 
Treasury, the current and a former IRS Commissioner, the American 
                                                                                                                 
60 Pub. L. No. 91–172, 83 Stat. 487. 
61 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, 29–62 (Joint Comm. Print 1970) (discussing the excise tax 
included in the Tax Reform Act of 1969). 
62 See I.R.C. § 4945 (2006) (imposing 20 percent excise tax on amounts paid or incurred 
by private foundations “to carry on propaganda, or otherwise to attempt, to influence legislation 
. . . [or] to influence the outcome of any specific public election, or to carry on, directly or 
indirectly, any voter registration drive”). 
63 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–172, 83 Stat. 487, 553 (codified as amended 
at I.R.C. § 172) (“the term ‘charitable contribution’ means a contribution or gift to or for the use 
of . . . a corporation, trust or community chest, fund, or foundation . . . no substantial part of the 
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, 
and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of 
statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office”). 
64 T.D. 6285, 1958–1 C.B. 127, 130 (discussing the regulation that provided substantially 
similar language as the later Tax Reform Act of 1969). 
65 There does not appear to be any legislative history that explains the change. 
66 Lobbying and Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. (1987). 
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Bar Association and various other external stakeholders.
67
 The Rule 
was criticized by a number of organizations,
68
 but, despite the 
criticism, Congress strengthened the Rule by giving the IRS 
additional enforcement tools.
69
 First, Congress clarified that the Rule 
applied to actions “in opposition to” a candidate as well as “on behalf 
of” a candidate.70 Second, Congress provided that when an 
organization loses its status as a charitable organization, it could not 
subsequently seek tax exemption under section 501(c)(4) of the 
Code.
71
 Third, Congress imposed a new excise tax on expenditures in 
violation of the Rule.
72
 Finally, Congress enhanced the audit and 
enforcement procedures available to the IRS.
73
 Congress was clear 
that the Political Activities Prohibition should not be weakened.
74
 
                                                                                                                 
67 See id. at 88 (prepared statement of Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy of 
the Department of the Treasury) (stating that the political campaign activity prohibition was 
“sound tax policy” because there “is little to be said in favor of a general government subsidy of 
political campaigns” and that the Treasury “supports continuation of this prohibition”); id. at 
95–100 (prepared statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs, Jr., Comm’r of Internal Revenue) 
(indicating the IRS supported continuation of the restrictions); id. at 130 (statement of John B. 
Jones, Jr., Chairman of Taxation at the American Bar Association) (indicating that because 
political activities are easier to objectively define than lobbying activities, policy makers “can 
be more Draconian and take stronger positions” to curb political activities); id. at 222–36 
(statement of former Comm’r of Internal Revenue Sheldon S. Cohen) (supporting the 
restrictions). 
68 See id. at 247 (prepared statement of Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., President, The Heritage 
Foundation) (stating that “repeal of the lobbying rules . . . . would signal a new openness—a 
welcomeness if you will—to charities, to schools, to educational institutions, and to churches, to 
assume a rightful role in the legislative arena”); id. at 426 (prepared statement of United States 
Catholic Conference) (arguing that “[t]he current broad IRS interpretation of the restriction has 
a substantial chilling effect on the role of churches and religious organizations in discussing not 
only particular candidates’ views on issues of importance to members of the faith, but also in 
discussing the issues themselves”). 
69 The 1987 House Committee Report accompanying the legislation acknowledged that 
revocation of charitable status alone might not deter many organizations, “particularly if the 
organization cease[d] operations after it has diverted all its assets to improper purposes” and 
therefore an additional excise tax and audit procedures were warranted. H.R. REP. NO. 100–391, 
at 1624 (1987). 
70 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–203, § 10711(a), 101 
Stat. 1330–464 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
71 Id. at § 10711(b) (codified at I.R.C. § 504(a)(2)) (amending provision that organizations 
ceasing to qualify for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) for substantial lobbying are ineligible 
for section 501(c)(4) status to include organizations that lose qualification for substantial 
political activities). Section 501(c)(4) provides for federal income tax exemption for “social 
welfare” organizations, but contributions to such organizations are not deductible as charitable 
contributions. I.R.C. § 504(c)(4). 
72 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 10712(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 4955) (imposing a 
10 percent excise tax on political expenditures by section 501(c)(3) organizations). 
73 Id. at § 10713(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 7409) (authorizing civil action on behalf of the 
United States to enjoin flagrant violations); id. at § 10713(b) (codified at I.R.C. § 6852) 
(authorizing immediate assessments for flagrant violations). 
74 See id. at 1624 (“The adoption of the excise tax sanction does not modify the present-
law rule that an organization does not qualify for tax-exempt status as a charitable organization, 
and is not eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions, unless the organization does not 
participate in, or intervene in, any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any 
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In short, since 1954, apart from some modest legislative 
enhancements, Congress has, with full knowledge of this fundamental 
principle of charitable tax law, left the Political Activities Prohibition 
alone. 
C. Criticisms of and Reasons for the Rule 
Over time, there have been attacks on the Political Activities 
Prohibition. Criticism comes essentially in three forms, relating either 
to mission, guidance, or enforcement.  
Regarding mission, some charitable organizations, especially some 
churches, may see it as their mission to speak about issues of the day. 
Although the Rule allows charities to speak on issues,
75
 such 
organizations believe that the Rule compromises their mission by 
denying the organization the ability to connect passion on the issues 
to the voting booth.
76
 There has been considerable scholarship 
addressing whether the Rule should be relaxed for such organizations, 
and whether the Rule could withstand a constitutional challenge under 
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.77 To the extent there 
                                                                                                                 
 
candidate for public office.”). 
75 See I.R.S., TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, Pub. No. 
1828, at 6 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf (“Churches and 
religious organizations may, however, involve themselves in issues of public policy without the 
activity being considered as lobbying. For example, churches may conduct educational 
meetings, prepare and distribute educational materials, or otherwise consider public policy 
issues in an educational manner without jeopardizing their tax-exempt status.”). 
76 See, e.g., CRIMM & WINER, supra note 27, at 7 (noting spiritual leaders may “feel 
theologically compelled to engage in political campaign speech”); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, 
Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 
B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1168–69 (2009) (footnote omitted) (noting that “[m]any religious faiths, 
perhaps all, view the transmission of a holistic worldview that impacts all aspects of their 
adherents’ lives as an integral part of their mission. Therefore it would not be surprising to find 
that some houses of worship believe instructing their congregations with respect to political 
involvement to be as important to their religious teaching as instructing them on personal 
relationships or finances.”); see also Review of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) 
Requirements for Religious Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 56 (2002) (statement of D. James Kennedy, Coral 
Ridge Ministries President) (noting that “[e]ven addressing moral concerns, such as abortion, 
from the pulpit during an election campaign may violate the IRS rule if abortion, for example, is 
under debate in the campaign. With so much uncertainty and so much at risk, silence is, 
regrettably, the only option for the minister who wants to ensure that the IRS does not open a 
file on his church.”). 
77 See generally CRIMM & WINER, supra note 27 (providing a thorough and penetrating 
analysis of the First Amendment issues raised by the Rule with respect to houses of worship); 
see also Mayer, supra note 76, at 1140 n.14 (collecting articles); id. at 1215 (arguing that as 
currently applied to “sermon[s] delivered during a house of worship’s regular service,” the 
prohibition would survive a Free Exercise challenge, but that such a challenge would be 
successful under the higher standard imposed by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
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have been serious recent legislative challenges to the Rule, they have 
occurred due to mission concerns.
78
  
Mission concerns go straight to the heart of the Rule. Other 
concerns are less direct. One of the most common complaints is that 
the Rule is imprecise. For charities that want to engage in activity that 
may be close to the political activity line, the absence of a bright line, 
and what is asserted to be insufficient guidance, provokes dissent.
79
 
Notwithstanding such complaints, there is a canon of guidance 
published by the IRS explaining the parameters of the Rule,
80
 and 
some courts have also weighed in.
81
 Criticism about lack of guidance 
is to a certain extent criticism of the lack of a bright line, or way of 
knowing in advance whether a contemplated activity is prohibited. 
Thus, the objection is partly directed to the overall facts and 
circumstances approach to the prohibition and the resulting lack of 
“yes or no” answers to questions about political activity.82 
Accordingly, some have suggested that the IRS should adopt a series 
of safe harbors.
83
 Others have urged that political activity be treated 
                                                                                                                 
78 Since 1987, a number of bills have been introduced in Congress to relax the Rule, but 
none has made it out of Committee. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the 
Ban on Political Activity by Charities, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 n.8 (2007) (listing bills 
from the 107th through the 110th Congresses). The House Committee on Ways and Means took 
up legislation on the subject in 2004, but it proved controversial and was eventually dropped. 
H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 692 (2004). The safe harbor provision, inserted as part of a much 
larger tax bill, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, would have allowed churches to keep 
charitable tax status for up to three violations of the prohibition, but the church would be 
subjected to tax based on its gross income, with the rate of tax increasing for each violation. Id. 
In the interest of disclosure, the author, at the time Counsel to the Congressional Joint 
Committee on Taxation for tax-exempt organization matters, helped to draft the legislation. 
79 See, e.g., Kay Guinane, Wanted: A Bright-Line Test Defining Prohibited Intervention in 
Elections by 501(c)(3) Organizations, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 142, 143 (2007) (arguing that 
the current standard is too vague). 
80 See Rev. Rul. 2007–41, 2007–1 C.B. 1421 (providing twenty-one examples of 
permitted and prohibited voter education activities, voter registration, candidate appearances, 
issue advocacy, rental of facilities, provision of mailing lists, use of websites and other 
activities); Rev. Rul. 86–95, 1986–2 C.B. 73 (allowing a series of public forums if the forum 
and content are neutral); Rev. Rul. 80–282, 1980–2 C.B. 178 (addressing factors that show bias 
in the timing and distribution of voter guides); Rev. Rul. 78–248, 1978–1 C.B. 154 (providing 
guidance on the permitted content and structure of candidate questionnaires); Rev. Rul. 74–574, 
1974–2 C.B. 161 (allowing sponsoring of candidate debates and forums that are educational and 
impartial); Rev. Rul. 67–71, 1967–1 C.B. 125 (providing that the evaluation of the 
qualifications of candidates or support for a slate of candidates violates the prohibition); Rev. 
Rul. 66–256, 1966–2 C.B. 210 (allowing sponsoring of candidate debates and forums that are 
educational and impartial). 
81 See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y. v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876, 881–82 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(finding that the rating of judicial candidates on a nonpartisan basis violated the Rule).  
82 See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous 
for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1350 (2007) (“The facts and 
circumstances approach has been widely criticized and poses significant problems for 501(c)(3) 
organizations.”). 
83 See Letter from Ellen Aprill, Professor at Loyola Law Sch., to the Comm’r of The 
Internal Revenue Serv. et al. (Nov. 29, 2005), reprinted in Loyola Professor Suggests IRS Issue 
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similar to lobbying.
84
 Relatedly, IRS enforcement of the Rule 
generates controversy through allegations of uneven enforcement
85
 or 
political bias.
86
  
Although such criticisms of the Rule are important, they should be 
put into the context of the charitable sector as a whole by considering 
which types of section 501(c)(3) organizations are most directly 
affected by the Rule. Generally, these are the organizations that either 
are compelled by their mission (or believe they are so compelled) to 
participate in politics, or advocacy-oriented organizations. The first 
type is somewhat exceptional, legally and practically.
87
 The second 
type, however, is the Rule’s precise target. Advocacy organizations, 
by their very nature, live on the line between campaign intervention 
and advocacy, between lobbying and education. It harkens back to the 
Reece Committee’s acknowledgement “that it is extremely difficult to 
draw the line between what should be permissible and what should 
not,”88 and so it has proved. But that there is activity around the line 
should come as no surprise. More important is that the frustration 
comes from just one segment of the charitable sector, which is just 
that, a segment. Notable is the relative quiescence with which the rest 
of the charitable sector, and the public, have accepted the Rule.
89
 
                                                                                                                 
 
Guidance on Charities and Political Activity, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 2, 2005, available at 
LEXIS, 2005 TNT 231–18 (providing letter urging guidance); Loyola Professor Proposes Safe 
Harbors for Political Campaign Activity by 501(c)(3) Groups, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 2, 
2005, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 231–19 (providing enclosure to Professor Aprill’s letter 
listing four specific safe harbors); Mayer, supra note 78, at 25 (arguing that the IRS should 
“create bright lines and safe harbors wherever possible”). 
84 See Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participation in Political Campaigns by 
Charities Essential to Their Vitality and Democracy? A Reply to Professor Tobin, 42 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1057, 1077 (2008) (arguing that “federal tax law could permit charitable entities to 
engage in electioneering to the same degree that they may engage in lobbying—as an 
insubstantial part of their total activity”). 
85 See Mayer, supra note 78, at 7–13 (summarizing the IRS’s recent enforcement efforts); 
Tobin, supra note 82, at 1354 (“The current enforcement regime creates uncertainty and has the 
potential for political manipulation.”). 
86 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., REP. OF INVESTIGATION OF 
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATION MATTERS 19 (Comm. Print 2000) (nothing that “[w]hile the Joint Committee 
staff found no credible evidence of political bias in the IRS’s selection of tax-exempt 
organizations . . . [it] did identify certain procedural and substantive problems . . . that may have 
contributed to a perception of unfairness”); Mayer, supra note 78, at 4–5 (discussing allegations 
of partisan bias).  
87 To examine the claims of religious organizations is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
there is considerable scholarship on the issue. See, e.g., CRIMM & WINER, supra note 27, at 
280–81, 315–16 (noting that legal authorities generally pertinent to analysis of the 
constitutionality of the Rule may not fully control in the context of houses of worship). 
88 H.R. Rep. No. 83–2681, at 219 (1954). 
89 Broadly speaking, the Rule is largely accepted by charitable organizations and the 
public. See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 314 (noting that “the prohibition has received little 
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This is because there are good reasons for the Rule, which explain 
not only its enactment, but its staying power. Although there is, 
without question, no unequivocal statement as to what Congress 
intended in 1913, 1917, 1934, or 1954 when it enacted the provisions 
for the tax-exempt status for charities, the deductibility of charitable 
contributions, the lobbying rule, or the Political Activities Prohibition, 
the restrictions on political and lobbying activity were no accident. 
The prevailing concern was definitional, that such activities were 
generally inconsistent with charity, as defined by Congress. Consider 
the following statements by Congress, the Treasury Department, and 
the courts:  
(1) The Treasury in 1919: “[A]ssociations formed to 
disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not 
educational within the meaning of the statute.”90  
(2) The Treasury in 1920: “It is a matter of common 
knowledge that propaganda in the popular sense is 
disseminated not primarily to benefit the individual at whom 
it is directed, but to accomplish the purpose or purposes of 
the person instigating it.”91  
(3) Circuit Judge, Learned Hand in 1930: “Political agitation 
as such is outside the statute, however innocent the aim . . . . 
Controversies of that sort must be conducted without public 
subvention: the Treasury stands aside from them.”92  
(4) Congress in 1954: “The foundations are free to do as they 
please with the public funds at their command, so long as 
they do not transgress certain rules of law . . . . Political 
propaganda, for example is proscribed.”93  
                                                                                                                 
 
attention”). There is no sense that charities find the Rule to be especially constraining: hospitals 
are more concerned with other aspects of charity law to be worrying about engaging in partisan 
activity. Colleges and universities have not argued that they should be allowed to engage in 
politics. Nor have social service organizations, cultural organizations, or even private 
foundations thought to place modifying or repealing the Rule on the agenda. (Lobbying of 
course is a different matter.) Id. (noting the extensive literature criticizing the lobbying 
restrictions). Support for change to the Rule also does not appear forthcoming from the public at 
large.  
90 T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 285 (1919). 
91 S. 1362, 2 C.B. 152, 154 (1920). 
92 Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930). 
93 H.R. Rep. No. 83–2681, at 22.  
 2/22/2012 5:30:46 PM 
2012] THE POLITICAL SPEECH OF CHARITIES 703 
(5) Congress in 1954: “[W]hen a proposed activity may have 
political implications, we cannot see any reason why public 
funds should be used when any political impact may result.”94 
Although these statements do not amount to any single rationale 
for the Rule,
95
 nevertheless, Congress uses the Rule to define charity 
for tax purposes. In doing so, it expresses a number of important and 
related policies, all of which serve the fundamental judgment that a 
political purpose is not a charitable purpose, and that political activity 
may not serve a charitable purpose.  
For instance, because of the Rule, a charitable section 501(c)(3) 
organization must focus on charitable not political purposes and must 
be free of partisanship. If education is the purpose of an organization, 
activities must be educational, and not veer into propaganda.
96
 The 
Rule is also an important defense mechanism because it protects 
charities from political capture and the serving of private interests. 
                                                                                                                 
94 Id. at 219. The report reiterated this rationale for a Political Activities Prohibition, 
stating that political activity by charitable organizations amounted to a “mis-use of public trust 
funds.” Id. at 18. 
95 In recent years, consensus appears to have emerged that, in general, there are three lines 
of justification for the Rule with varying degrees of resonance. First is the idea that the federal 
government should remain neutral in political affairs, or the “nonsubvention principle.” The 
principle’s pedigree is Judge Learned Hand’s statement in Slee that “[c]ontroversies of that sort 
[i.e., political agitation] must be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside 
from them.” 42 F.2d at 185. Second, the Rule has been justified as a means of supporting the 
private benefit doctrine: namely, political activity is viewed as an activity for private gain and 
not for public benefit, and therefore should not be subsidized. Chisolm, supra note 30, at 358–
59. Third, charity, by definition, just does not include political activity (including lobbying). 
See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign Activity 
by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1090–92 (2007) (summarizing 
and responding to the argument that electioneering by charitable entities should be forbidden 
because political activities are not charitable); Chisolm, supra note 30, at 359–62 (same).  
Each of those rationales has been criticized, as, in general, insufficient to support the Rule. 
Buckles, supra note 95, at 1078–92 (addressing the three justifications for the Rule and arguing 
they are not sufficient to prohibit all charitable entities from engaging in political activities). The 
neutrality rationale is perhaps the easiest to criticize. Neutrality can be maintained equally 
effectively with a prohibition or its opposite—unlimited political activity for all charities. In 
either case, government remains “neutral.” Regardless, each of the three rationales seems to be a 
variation on the definitional theme, with neutrality and preventing private benefit being 
derivative theories. As Judge Hand said, if “[p]olitical agitation as such is outside the statute,” 
then it follows that “the Treasury stands aside from them,” i.e., does not subsidize. Slee, 42 F.2d 
at 185. In other words, the neutrality rationale is little more than another way to assert that 
charity is defined not to include political activity; i.e., public funds are not to be used or spent on 
political activity. It follows quite naturally that what is not charity will not be supported by the 
charitable tax benefits; the Treasury will “stand aside” from noncharitable activity and not 
“provide a subsidy” for it. Similarly, the no-private-benefit rationale is yet another way to say 
the same or a like thing. The no-private-benefit rule itself is derived from the charitable purpose 
requirement as an organization cannot primarily be charitable if it is operated primarily for 
private interests.  
96 T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 285 (1919) (“[A]ssociations formed to 
disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not educational within the meaning of the 
statute.”). 
 2/22/2012 5:30:46 PM 
704 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 
Political activity, partisanship, bias, and non-neutrality often are 
equated and generally regarded as serving private interests.
97
 By 
barring all political activity, the Rule removes any discretion 
otherwise left to the IRS to determine when private benefit exists. 
Thus, the Rule is a prophylactic measure; i.e., Congress felt 
comfortable enough to say flat out that certain activity is not 
permitted.  
In addition, and perhaps most critically, the Rule provides an outer 
boundary to the scope of the charitable sector, despite the difficulties 
of enforcement. Policing the border of the charitable exemption,
98
 the 
Rule is one of the few bright-lines
99
 that places a meaningful limit on 
the charitable purpose requirement and so constrains the scope of the 
charitable tax benefits.
100
 As discussed in Part IV of this Article, 
alternatives to the Rule would mean loss of this border control 
function, and so are not appealing, conceptually or administratively. 
They would also likely lead to a significant loss of revenue.  
In short, fundamentally, the decision about what is and is not 
charitable, given a baseline of taxable status and nondeductibility of 
contributions to organizations,
101
 is a revenue decision by Congress. It 
is not a metaphysical question about the true meaning of charity, apart 
from what Congress (or the courts) thinks it means. Those who 
disagree with the policy may dissent, but the decision is considered 
policy nonetheless. In providing tax benefits, Congress had some idea 
about what constituted a charitable purpose or a charitable 
activity
102—the details were left to events. And events confirmed and 
reaffirmed the initial instinct that charity and political activity, for 
purposes of the tax law, were mutually exclusive. 
                                                                                                                 
97 See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 337 (“[A]llowing political involvement invites misuse of 
the section 501(c)(3) form in pursuit of private interests, rather than for the broad public benefit 
that the charitable classification is designed to promote.”). 
98 See, e.g., Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 27, at 284–85 (explaining that the 
Political Activities Prohibition serves a “border control” function, namely, keeping the public 
affairs and charitable spheres separate). 
99 The others are the lobbying limitation and the taxation of unrelated business income. 
I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 511–514 (2006). 
100 Rules that provide some constraint to the scope of the charitable tax benefits are 
important especially in light of the recent growth of the charitable sector, the relatively open-
ended nature of charitable tax status, and the relative lack of enforcement or enforceable rules. 
For a discussion, see Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 
11 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2011). 
101 But see CRIMM & WINER, supra note 27, at 285 (stating that for houses of worship 
“[h]istorically . . . the tax exemption is the baseline; [the exemption] was in place for many 
decades before the Johnson Amendment added the restraint on political campaign speech”). 
102 See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 346 (discussing Congress’s attempts to define 
“charitable purposes”).  
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Of course, just because Congress has answered the question, it 
does not follow that the policy should continue in perpetuity.
103
 In 
theory, the idea of charitable organizations taking sides in politics is 
attractive. Under a free market of ideas approach to speech, the truth, 
or information, will be better served with more speech. The public 
will have new perspectives to consider that may be more informative, 
educational, and detached than many of the political voices shrieking 
the loudest today.  
Further, allowing political activity by charities is not a mandate; 
charities may remain agnostic and apart from the political process. To 
the extent that the consumers of charity do not want charities to 
become involved in politics, many, if not most, charities will respond 
to this sentiment and remain aloof. It is easy to imagine a charity, 
dipping a toe in the political water to endorse a candidate for the first 
time, only to hear from angry donors and others that the activity was 
inappropriate. A charity’s stakeholders might also accuse the charity 
of endorsing the wrong candidate, or argue that the charity should not 
even risk endorsing a losing candidate, for fear of jeopardizing the 
charity’s standing in the community as an opponent of an elected 
official. Just as with for-profit corporations,
104
 the risk that a charity’s 
direct political activity could harm its relationships with its supporters 
is likely to be high, and constraining.
105
 Moreover, in a sector of over 
1.5 million organizations,
106
 not including churches,
107
 the percentage 
                                                                                                                 
103 Debate about the proper relationship between politics and charity is an ongoing one. In 
a recent spirited defense of the Rule, Professor Donald Tobin argued that the Rule protects the 
independence of section 501(c)(3) organizations, that campaign intervention generally is 
inconsistent with an educational or charitable mission, and that campaigning by section 
501(c)(3) organizations would harm the democratic process. Tobin, supra note 82, at 1319–20. 
By contrast, others believe that free speech and organizational mission would be better served if 
charities had a political voice. See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 84, at 1062 (responding to Tobin’s 
argument). The debate is an earnest one, and perhaps may fairly be characterized as a policy 
struggle between those concerned about the consequences of a partisan and “not so 
independent” sector and those embracing a braver world of new political voices informing the 
public debate.  
104 See Jia Lynn Yang & Dan Eggen, Campaign Spending Puts Target in Bulls-Eye, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2010, at A1 (discussing the repercussions of Target’s decision to donate 
money to a pro-business group). 
105 See, e.g., Frances R. Hill, Corporate Philanthropy and Campaign Finance: Exempt 
Organizations as Corporate-Candidate Conduits, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 941 (1997) (“To 
the extent that particular exempt organizations take positions on particular electoral contests, 
they may gain the advantage of intensifying the support of some members and even of attracting 
some new members, but they also risk alienating current and potential members and supporters. 
For exempt organizations with their own agendas of exempt activity, these risks should be taken 
seriously.”). 
106 MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40919, AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 3 (2009). This figure does not include 
organizations that do not file an exemption application with the IRS, which could number in the 
hundreds of thousands (e.g., churches, other qualifying religious organizations, and very small 
organizations). Id. Approximately 116,000 of the 1.5 million organizations are private 
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of those likely to do much more than endorse a candidate is likely to 
be small—politics is not really a natural fit for many charities.  
So, for the most part,
108
 a relaxation of the Political Activities 
Prohibition should not dramatically change the makeup of the 
activities of existing organizations. Charities that already advocate on 
issues, a small percentage of the total, are expected to do so by their 
supporters and will have more tools to advance their mission. More 
traditional charities—hospitals, colleges and universities, social 
service organizations, and arts organizations—might abstain from a 
new found freedom to engage in politics. Churches may be unique. 
Some would likely endorse candidates and take more active electoral 
steps. Others would not. Some might regret a foray into politics. 
Others might relish it. But the ultimate success or failure of the 
project would likely be decided by the parishioners—who can vote 
with their feet.  
Taking the above thoughts into account, the Rule and its defenders 
may come across as paternalistic and overly concerned about what 
might happen. The parade of horribles offered—the loss of 
independence, the diversion from, and perhaps compromise of, 
mission, in effect the corruption of the sector—would be a terrible 
outcome. Need it be feared? There should be little dispute that the 
admirable and aspirational qualities of charitable organizations are, to 
a certain extent, noble ones; a nobility that rises above faction. The 
sphere of political campaigns, by contrast, is characterized by 
fighting, deceit, and dirty maneuvers—all perhaps in the service of a 
public good—but hardly noble qualities. Being in service to ideas, 
helping others, advancing culture, and delivering a needed good are 
the core expectations that we have of charity. While permitting 
involvement in political activities may not necessarily lead to the 
corruption of the charitable sector, it would introduce an ignoble 
quality to the sector from which the Rule has provided a shield. And, 
as discussed in Part IV, it would seriously dilute an already fluid 
concept of charity.  
Ultimately, whether the Rule should be changed is a question that 
should be decided not from fear about what might happen, but rather 
by reconsidering the questions Congress already answered in enacting 
the Rule: Is political activity charitable? Should it be? It is noteworthy 
                                                                                                                 
 
foundations. Id. 
107 See id. at 3 (“Churches and other qualifying religious organizations are exempt from the 
annual information-reporting requirements.”). 
108 As argued in Part IV, however, change to the Rule likely would bring many new 
entrants. 
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that we live in a time where distrust of government is high. The 
public’s distrust of government could be a product of the intense 
partisanship and preeminence of selfish motives that is part of the 
political process. Distrust of many of our institutions, public or 
private, for-profit or not-for-profit, is also high. Such distrust, many 
would argue, is not warranted. But to the extent that the Rule protects 
an important part of our society from further distrust, it is a good 
thing. 
II. DOES CITIZENS UNITED CONDEMN THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
PROHIBITION? 
A. Introduction 
The reason to question anew the Political Activities Prohibition 
stems from the Supreme Court’s recent decision Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission.
109
 The case concerned a nonprofit 
corporation, Citizens United, organized under section 501(c)(4) of the 
Code.
110
 In January 2008, Citizens United released a film called 
“Hillary: The Movie,” which was very critical of Hillary Clinton, who 
was at the time a senator and a candidate for the presidency.
111
 The 
Court concluded that “there is no reasonable interpretation of Hillary 
other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton” and that “the 
film qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”112 
Accordingly, the Court said, section 441b of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (“FECA”),113 as amended, prevented Citizens United 
from releasing the film.
114
 The Court held, however, that the part of 
                                                                                                                 
109 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
110 Id. at 936 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to the Court, Citizens United had an 
annual budget of about $12 million, and received most of its funds from individuals but also 
received some contributions from for-profit corporations. Id. at 887. Because of the corporate 
contributions, Citizens United could not qualify for the exception to the rule created in Federal 
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986), that 
restrictions on corporate expenditures in political campaigns were unconstitutional as applied to 
nonprofit corporations “that were formed for the sole purpose of promoting political ideas, did 
not engage in business activities, and did not accept contributions from for-profit corporations 
or labor unions.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891. Section 501(c)(4) of the Code describes 
“social welfare” organizations. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006). It differs from section 501(c)(3) of the 
Code in several important respects. See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining the distinctions between 
section 501(c)(3) and section 501(c)(4) organizations). 
111 130 S. Ct. at 887. 
112 Id. at 890. 
113 Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) 
(2006)). 
114 130 S. Ct. at 891. Section 441b(a) provides in part that: “It is unlawful for . . . any 
corporation . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any 
political office . . . .” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006). Section 441b(b)(2) provides that the term 
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section 441b that bars corporations from making independent 
expenditures and electioneering communications (the “Electioneering 
Rule”) was an unconstitutional burden on Citizens United’s right to 
free speech under the First Amendment, and, therefore Citizens 
United had a right to release the film.
115
 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court overruled a prior decision, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce
116
 in its entirety, and part of McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission.
117
 
Assume that subsequently, in 2012, a corporation called “Our 
Country,” recognized as a charity under section 501(c)(3) of the 
Code, releases a film called Obama: The Movie. This movie is, in 
many respects, a sequel to Hillary but with a different star and bears 
no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote against 
President Obama in his campaign for re-election. The IRS 
investigates the organization, concludes there has been a violation of 
the Political Activities Prohibition, and revokes Our Country’s tax-
exempt status. Our Country appeals, the case reaches the Supreme 
Court, and the Court must rule on the constitutionality of the Political 
Activities Prohibition. The Court will either distinguish or follow 
Citizens United, making careful analysis of the Court’s opinion in 
Citizens United critical to understanding the continuing validity of the 
Political Activities Prohibition.  
The key threshold issue for the Court in Citizens United was 
whether the Electioneering Rule was a burden on speech.
118
 The 
Court answered in the affirmative.
119
 Strict scrutiny of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
“‘contribution or expenditure’ includes a contribution or expenditure . . . for any applicable 
electioneering communication.” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2). 
115 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917. 
116 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130. S. Ct. at 913.  
117 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
118 130 S. Ct. at 892. In general, understanding the structure of the Court’s majority 
opinion is useful. The opinion is divided into five parts. Part I provides the factual and 
procedural background. Id. at 886–88. Part II explains why the Court undertook a facial 
challenge to the statute (instead of an as-applied challenge), and why the Court believed that it 
had to decide the constitutional issue directly, i.e., without resorting to circumlocutions of 
statutory interpretation. Id. at 888–96. Part III is organized into introductory material, id. at 896–
99, and then four sections, A, B, C, and D. In Part III.A, the Court explained its conclusion that 
there are conflicting lines of precedent regarding the constitutionality of the Electioneering 
Rule, thus warranting its decision. Id. at 899–903. Part III.B analyzed the three proffered 
government interests in the Electioneering Rule—the anti-distortion rationale, corruption and 
the appearance of corruption, and shareholder protection—concluding that none is a compelling 
state interest. Id. at 903–11. Part III.C discussed the relevance of stare decisis to the Court’s 
decision. Id. at 911–13. Part III.D explicitly overruled Austin, as well as a portion of McConnell. 
Id. at 913. Part IV related to the disclosure provisions. Id. at 913–16. In Part V, the Court 
concluded. Id. at 916–17. 
119 Id. at 917.  
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Electioneering Rule followed, requiring a compelling state interest in 
support of it, which was held not to exist.
120
 Importantly, in 
concluding that the Electioneering Rule was a burden on speech, the 
Court considered four factors: (1) the purpose of the Electioneering 
Rule to suppress speech; (2) the criminal sanction for violating the 
Electioneering Rule; (3) the nature of the rule as a ban on speech; and 
(4) the Electioneering Rule’s identification of certain preferred 
speakers.
121
 As discussed below, however, with respect to each of 
these factors—purpose, sanction, and a ban on corporate speech—the 
Political Activities Prohibition is distinguishable from the 
Electioneering Rule and Citizens United. Accordingly, the Court is 
not compelled to follow the reasoning of Citizens United in 
considering the Political Activities Prohibition, which, as argued 
infra, is not a burden on speech in the same sense as the 
Electioneering Rule. Therefore, the Political Activities Prohibition 
should be subject to a lesser standard of review (and thus probably 
survive scrutiny). 
B. Purpose of the Rule  
1. Purpose of Section 501(c)(3) is to Define Charity for Tax Purposes 
There is little room to doubt that the Electioneering Rule of section 
441b, including the now unconstitutional ban on corporate 
independent expenditures, is a rule “to control or suppress speech.”122 
The ban on corporate contributions to political candidates and 
campaigns and the ban on corporate independent expenditures are 
overt Congressional efforts to regulate speech in the electoral process. 
Indeed, the entire apparatus of campaign finance laws and regulations 
are intended to regulate core First Amendment speech. Accordingly, 
Part III of the Court’s opinion in Citizens United began by quoting the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”123 Then, the Court said that 
“[l]aws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different 
points in the speech process.”124 Implicit in this statement is the 
                                                                                                                 
120 Id. at 903–11. 
121 Id. at 896–99. The implications of Citizens United for the Political Activities 
Prohibition lie mostly in the introductory material to Part III of the Court’s opinion, in which the 
Court provided the decision’s framework, equally applicable to Our Country in the hypothetical 
posed above as to Citizens United. See also Galston, supra note 12, at 890–902 (describing the 
scrutiny through which the court reviews campaign finance laws). 
122 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896. 
123 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
124 Id. 
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Court’s articulation of the purpose of the Electioneering Rule: to 
control or suppress speech. The Court later reiterated that the 
Electioneering Rule’s “purpose and effect” is “to silence entities 
whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.”125 
By contrast, section 501(c)(3) of the Code has a different purpose. 
Notwithstanding that the rationale for section 501(c)(3) has been 
debated amid an obscure legislative history,
126
 the section manifestly 
is not about the regulation of speech. It is not a law “enacted to 
control or suppress speech.”127 Rather, it is a law enacted to describe a 
type of organization that is not subject to federal income tax.  
Congress requires a section 501(c)(3) organization
128
 to meet four 
requirements: (1) it must be organized and operated for an exempt 
purpose; (2) no earnings of the organization may inure to the benefit 
of insiders; (3) there may be no substantial lobbying; and (4) no 
political activity is allowed.
129
 If all four requirements are met on an 
ongoing basis, then the organization is a “charity” for tax law 
purposes. 
The statute’s structure is important because it shows that the 
Political Activities Prohibition is definitional. Quite simply, an 
organization is not a charity under section 501(c)(3) if it engages in 
political activity. This matters because there is an ongoing fault-line 
between “charity” for tax law purposes and “charity” viewed more 
normatively and apart from the tax law. Often, commentators describe 
charity in the normative, aspirational sense and the Political Activities 
                                                                                                                 
125 Id. at 898.  
126 See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charitable Tax 
Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 590 n.23 (1998) (explaining the several theories behind 
charitable exemptions but highlighting the lack of legislative expression regarding tax benefits 
for charities); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for 
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 430–39 (1998) 
(exploring several theories of charitable tax exemption). 
127 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896. The cases the Citizens United Court cited for 
examples of unconstitutional laws that suppress speech are all qualitatively different from 
section 501(c)(3). See id. at 896–97 (citing Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. 
Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–66 (2002) (striking down a village ordinance regulating 
door-to-door canvassing on First Amendment grounds as applied to religious proselytizing, 
anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (finding a state financial 
regulation inconsistent with the First Amendment because it placed a content-based financial 
burden on speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (per curiam) (finding that 
the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the First Amendment because it failed to 
distinguish mere advocacy and abstract teaching from incitement to imminent lawless action); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (reversing judgment awarded in a civil 
libel action as inconsistent with First Amendment principles of freedom of speech and of the 
press because statements critical of public officials in their official conduct are protected)). 
128 A section 501(c)(3) organization can take the form of a corporation, community chest, 
fund, or foundation. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
129 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).  
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Prohibition as if it were external to charity, properly defined, viewing 
charity independently of the Rule.
130
 This is in many respects the 
principal tension underlying charitable exemption: organizations may 
view section 501(c)(3) status as an entitlement, and any conditions 
imposed for such status as anathema.  
For example, Professor Chisolm described the Political Activities 
Prohibition as “an unavoidable choice: either exercise its right to free 
political expression and forfeit the benefit of tax exemption to which 
its charitable character otherwise entitles it, or claim its entitlement 
and forgo the right.”131 But note that, because the Political Activities 
Prohibition is definitional, an organization that engages in political 
activity does not have a “charitable character,” at least not under the 
tax law. This illustrates the normative versus the tax law definition of 
charity. Professor Chisolm argued more from the normative side—
whether charity should be defined as exclusive of political activity for 
tax law purposes. Thus, in her analysis of the Rule’s rationale, she 
said that the reason for the Rule could have stemmed from 
“definitional consistency.”132 That is, Congress decided that the tax 
law definition of charity should conform to its understanding of a 
common law definition. Nevertheless, although definitional 
consistency may explain Congress’s decision, the point is that 
Congress did not have to define charity as it did, or in accord with any 
common law or other norm. What matters is that Congress did decide 
to define charity to include the Political Activities Prohibition, and 
not whether charity in a normative sense should include such a rule.  
Further, the purpose of the definition was not to suppress speech. 
As discussed above, there are many reasons supporting a prohibition 
on political activities as part of the definition of a tax-exempt charity: 
(1) Congress wants charities to focus on core charitable activity; (2) 
Congress wants a charitable sector untainted by partisan flavor; (3) 
Congress does not want to subsidize political activity through 
exemption; (4) Congress wants to protect charities from political 
capture; and (5) Congress does not think political activity is charitable 
activity.
133
 In short, Congress decided to define charity to exclude 
political activity (and private inurement, and substantial lobbying). In 
so doing, Congress was trying to promote something, charity, by 
                                                                                                                 
130 See, e.g., Joseph S. Klapach, Note, Thou Shalt Not Politic: A Principled Approach to 
Section 501(c)(3)’s Prohibition of Political Campaign Activity, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 504, 506 
(describing a charity as having to do a “deal with the IRS” under which “the charity must 
sacrifice its ‘soul’”). 
131 See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 332. 
132 Id. at 344. 
133 See supra Part I.C (discussing the justifications for and criticisms of the Rule). 
 2/22/2012 5:30:46 PM 
712 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 
excluding certain activities. The Rule is not primarily about 
suppressing speech.  
Similarly, section 170(c) of the Code is a law enacted to describe 
the type of organization with respect to which charitable—and so 
deductible—contributions may be made.134 It too is not a law 
“enacted to control or suppress speech.”135 Both sections of the Code 
directly implicate speech, to be sure, but their overriding purpose is 
not to regulate speech. 
2. Purpose of the Rule Viewed as Part of the Tax-Exemption System 
In addition, to decide whether the Political Activities Prohibition 
of section 501(c)(3) is a law with a purpose of suppressing speech, 
and thus is a First Amendment case, or is a law with a revenue 
purpose, and thus a tax case that touches on speech, it is instructive to 
consider other sections of the Code pertaining to federal income tax 
exemption. Just as section 441b’s purpose is understood in light of the 
purpose of the FECA to regulate elections, similarly, the purpose of 
tax exemption and its relationship to partisan activity is better 
understood by viewing the entire statutory scheme. As the Supreme 
Court said in the related context of the lobbying limitation of section 
501(c)(3): “it is necessary to understand the effect of the tax-
exemption system enacted by Congress.”136 
Importantly, the “tax-exemption system” covers many types of 
organizations, not just section 501(c)(3) organizations. The law of 
tax-exempt organizations describes at least twenty-nine types of 
organizations.
137
 Each type may qualify for a tax treatment that is 
other than the default treatment for the organization. For example, if 
an organization incorporates, then as a general matter, it is subject to 
tax as a corporation under subchapter C of the Code, unless it can and 
does elect to be treated differently, or it qualifies for different 
treatment under one of the exempt organization provisions. Notably, 
no tax-related political activities prohibition applies to the default 
treatment of the corporation as a corporation.
138
 Instead, limitations 
                                                                                                                 
134 I.R.C. § 170(c) (2006). 
135 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010). 
136 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (emphasis 
added).  
137 Section 501(a) of the Code provides exemption from federal income tax to 
organizations described in section 501(c) or (d) and section 401. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006). There 
are more than 29 types of organizations described in section 501(c) and (d), of which section 
501(c)(3) organizations are but one type. I.R.C. § 501(c)–(d). Section 401 of the Code describes 
various types of pension plans. I.R.C. § 401. 
138 The Electioneering Rule was imposed upon the corporation as a corporation. See infra 
text accompanying notes 188–90 (explaining that the Electioneering Rule is an entity level rule 
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on political activities are a result of a choice of other than the default 
tax treatment. 
Of the many exempt organization types, only one—the section 
501(c)(3) organization—is subject to a prohibition on political 
activities.
139
 Other tax-exempt entities may and do participate in 
political activity. For example, the social welfare organization 
described in section 501(c)(4) of the Code is permitted to engage in 
political activity so long as the activity does not become its principal 
activity.
140
 In general, this same conceptual approach to political 
activity applies to other exempt organizations—i.e., absent a 
prohibition, the activity generally is permitted. Accordingly, for 
exempt organizations other than section 501(c)(3) organizations, the 
question of political activity concerns the extent to which political 
activity may become inconsistent with the organization’s exemption 
type so as to change the nature of the organization and disqualify it 
from its otherwise applicable tax status. 
If an organization crosses a line so that its primary purpose is to 
influence elections, the “tax exemption system” of the Code has an 
answer: section 527. Section 527 provides for the tax treatment of 
political organizations, i.e., an organization that is organized and 
operated primarily for partisan activity.
141
 Political organizations are 
defined based entirely on the purpose of the organization (irrespective 
of organizational form), and the tax treatment follows the 
definition.
142
 Further, Congress was aware that some exempt 
organizations might engage in partisan activity but fall short of 
political organization status. Thus, if an exempt organization 
(meaning here any of the 29 organization types listed in section 
                                                                                                                 
 
unlike the Political Activities Prohibition). 
139 In general, this means that the activities of a political organization and a charitable 
organization are mutually exclusive. See supra Part I.C. But at least one activity—attempting to 
influence the confirmation of judicial appointments—qualifies as a political activity for 
purposes of section 527 but not as political activity for purposes of section 501(c)(3). I.R.S. 
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39694 (Feb. 22, 1988). 
140 Rev. Rul. 81–95, 1981–1 C.B. 332; Rev. Rul. 67–368, 1967–2 C.B. 194. 
141 I.R.C. § 527 (2006). 
142 I.R.C. § 527(a), (e)(1). Although political organizations are often referred to as 
“exempt” organizations, this is mostly a misnomer, due in part to the location of the political 
organization provisions in the Code in the 500 series and to the terminology of the section—
referring to “exempt function” and “exempt function income.” Section 527 organizations are 
best viewed as a distinct type of organization for tax purposes, with a special set of tax rules. 
See generally Roger Colinvaux, Regulation of Political Organizations and the Red Herring of 
Tax Exempt Status, 59 NAT’L. TAX J. 531 (2006) (describing the tax treatment of section 527 
organizations). 
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501(c)) spends money on partisan activity, the organization is subject 
to the tax rules of section 527.
143
  
In sum, to a certain extent, with respect to political activity, the 
“tax exemption system” can be viewed as covering a spectrum of 
organizations. Section 501(c)(3) organizations, which participate in 
no political activity, are on one extreme. And section 527 
organizations are on the other, participating in unlimited political 
activity as a primary purpose. Other exempt organizations, which can 
participate in political activity to the extent that the activity does not 
subsume the organization, are somewhere in between. 
The presence of such an elaborate, if somewhat ad hoc, system 
sheds light on the purpose of limits on political activity for tax 
purposes. Beginning with the default, taxable status, there are no tax 
restrictions on political activity. But if an organization claims an 
exemption, limitations follow. The limits can be severe or moderate 
depending upon the nature of the exempt status claimed. The 
important point, however, is that political activity, and expenses for 
and income from partisan speech, is and always has been a special 
subject for the tax law. As an activity, it is neither promoted nor 
suppressed. The restrictions arise as incidental to the aim of 
exemption. That is, some other activity (the exempt activity) might be 
promoted relative to political activity, but suppression of political 
activity as such is not the goal. Where political activity is relevant, the 
concerns are whether the activity is consistent with the organization’s 
tax status, the extent to which it is consistent, and the appropriate tax 
treatment for a completely partisan organization. The only exempt 
organization facing a prohibition is the section 501(c)(3) organization. 
This can be explained not only because of special concerns about the 
politicization of charity, but also because of other tax benefits related 
to charities—generally unavailable to other exempt organizations—
such as the charitable deduction.
144
 
In short, not all entities are treated alike for tax purposes. To the 
extent the tax law has made distinctions based on political activity, it 
is not limited to section 501(c)(3) organizations, but covers many 
others. Arguably, in no case has the purpose of the tax classification 
and political activity rules been based on a desire to suppress speech. 
Importantly, to the extent Citizens United calls into question the 
validity of the Political Activities Prohibition, the impact will be 
                                                                                                                 
143 See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (providing generally for tax on the lesser of a section 501(c) 
organization’s investment income or the amount spent on political activity). 
144 I.R.C. § 170(a). See also Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by 
Nonprofit Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85 (1993) (describing the benefits accorded to 
nonprofit organizations). 
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much broader, really calling into question the basic decision made by 
Congress that a partisan activity is significant for tax purposes.
145
  
3. Purpose and Institutional Considerations 
In addition, the respective purposes of the Electioneering Rule and 
the Political Activities Prohibition play an important role as a 
background consideration in comparing Citizens United and the 
hypothetical Our Country posed above in Part II.A. Laws with the 
purpose of regulating speech are likely to be strongly shaped by the 
Supreme Court, but laws directed to tax classifications may receive 
greater deference.  
Thus, because the purpose of the campaign finance law is to 
regulate speech, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has 
developed a rich, detailed, complex, and varied jurisprudence in the 
campaign finance arena. Over the twenty-four year period from the 
landmark case Buckley v. Valeo
146
 to Citizen’s United, there have 
been no fewer than seventeen Supreme Court opinions on the 
constitutionality of the campaign finance laws.
147
 Indeed, it is fair to 
                                                                                                                 
145 See supra Part I.A (explaining the reasoning behind Congress’s determination that 
partisan activity is significant for tax purposes). 
146 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
147 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (ruling that restrictions on 
corporate spending on election campaign ads that advocate based on issues are subject to strict 
scrutiny and are unconstitutional); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (holding that 
Vermont’s campaign finance statute violated the First Amendment because it restricted the 
amounts candidates could spend on their campaigns and restricted the amounts that individuals, 
organizations, and political parties could contribute to those campaigns); McConnell v. FEC, 
540 U.S. 93 (2003) (holding that most soft money provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act did not violate free speech and association rights), overruled in part by Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (ruling that 
prohibiting nonprofit advocacy corporations to make direct contributions to federal elections is 
consistent with the First Amendment); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 
U.S. 431 (2001) (holding that limits on coordinated expenditures of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act are constitutional as they are not an undue burden); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding Missouri’s campaign finance law limiting contributions 
to state political candidates); Col. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 
(1996) (finding that independent political expenditures by political parties do not violate the 
Federal Election Campaign Act’s restrictions); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding a restriction on corporate treasury funding of state candidate 
elections), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 
479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that defendant’s violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
was trumped by its First Amendment rights and therefore the statute was unconstitutional as 
applied to defendant); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) 
(holding that the provision of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act limiting 
expenditures by political parties was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment); 
FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (determining who is a member for 
purposes of the Federal Election Campaign Act); Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign 
Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (holding that the disclosure requirement of an Ohio campaign law 
was unconstitutional when applied to a minor political party); Bread Political Action Comm. v. 
FEC, 455 U.S. 577 (1982) (denying expedited review of the Federal Election Campaign Act to 
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say that the Supreme Court’s constant presence in the campaign 
finance area has made it a key institutional actor with a vested interest 
in shaping these laws through its jurisprudence. Since Buckley, the 
political battles and constitutional questions have been almost 
ceaseless. Dissenting justices have consistently voiced their opinion 
that Buckley was wrongly decided.
148
 And it has been common to 
speculate whether the next case will bring a major shift in the 
constitutionality of prevailing campaign finance rules.
149
 Despite its 
high controversy—including accusations that the Court decided a 
question not properly raised,
150
 and overturned decades of precedent 
with barely a nod to the importance of stare decisis
151—Citizens 
United was not entirely a surprise. The Court has sent signals for 
years, either through the complexity of its own rulings or through the 
voices of individual justices, that all was not well with the 
congressional (and the Federal Election Commission’s) approach to 
the regulation of campaign finance.
152
 
By contrast, the purpose of sections 501(c)(3) and 170 is to 
provide an exemption and a deduction, i.e., to describe organizations 
                                                                                                                 
 
group not listed as eligible in the statute); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 
454 U.S. 290 (1981) (holding that a limit in an ordinance on the right of association was 
unconstitutional); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981) 
(holding that the Federal Election Campaign Act does not foreclose the use of agency 
agreements); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of 
contribution limits against First and Fifth Amendment challenges); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (declaring a state criminal statute that denied corporations the 
right to make political contributions unconstitutional). 
148 See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“I 
continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo . . . was wrongly decided . . . .”); Nat’l Conservative 
PAC, 470 U.S. at 507 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“I continue to believe that 
Buckley v. Valeo . . . was wrongly decided.”). 
149 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Set to Weigh Central Election-Law Issues, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at A14 (speculating about the upcoming 2006 Supreme Court 
decision in Randall v. Sorrell, wherein a Vermont campaign finance law was challenged); 
Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Neil A. Lewis, Campaign Law Set for Big Test In a Courtroom, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at A1 (discussing the upcoming 2003 Supreme Court decision in 
McConnell v. FEC, which involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold 
Act). 
150 Adam Liptak, Justices Turn Minor Movie Case Into a Blockbuster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 2010, at A13 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 932 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“‘Essentially,’ Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the dissenters in the 5–to–4 
decision, ‘five justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they 
changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.’”). 
151 Adam Liptak, Stevens Era, Nearing End, Takes On An Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 
2010, at A12 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 942 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“In his 
dissent, Justice Stevens said no principle required overruling two major campaign finance 
precedents. ‘The only relevant thing that has changed since’ those decisions, he wrote, ‘is the 
composition of this court.’”).  
152 See supra notes 148 and accompanying text (discussing skepticism amongst some 
justices that Buckley v. Valeo was wrongly decided). 
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and expenses that for purposes of the tax system are treated 
differently than others. It should come as no surprise that the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is much less varied, complex, and 
voluminous in this area. Here, we are not speaking of the Court’s role 
in exercising judicial review of the Constitution, but rather of 
Congress’s role in raising revenue, and the extent to which the means 
chosen by Congress implicate constitutional concerns.
153
 
Accordingly, tax cases challenging deductions and exemptions 
generally must overcome the Court’s deferential posture: deductions 
are a matter of legislative grace.
154
  
More specifically, Supreme Court cases involving section 
501(c)(3) (or its predecessors) are few and far between. The two most 
relevant cases, Cammarano v. United States
155
 and Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation of Washington (“TWR”),156 are unanimous 
decisions
157
 that largely and summarily affirm Congress’s decision to 
place limitations on speech in connection with a deduction or an 
exemption. A third case, Speiser v. Randall,
158
 also is summary by 
today’s standards, but this time in the opposite direction: striking 
down a state exemption because of its implications on free speech.
159
 
Speiser, however, as discussed below, is readily distinguishable from 
the Cammarano and TWR approach.
160
 
In any event, the sparsity of cases places any challenge to the 
Political Activities Prohibition in a much different political and legal 
context. Unlike the campaign finance area, in tax cases generally, and 
section 501(c)(3) cases in particular, the Court does not have a rich 
history or institutional voice.
161
 In short, the Court is not defending its 
                                                                                                                 
153 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) 
(referring to the lobbying limitation as a decision by Congress not to subsidize the activity, the 
Court concluded, “[w]e have no doubt but that this statute is within Congress’ broad power in 
this area”); see also Galston, supra note 12, at 891–97 (discussing the Court’s deferential tax 
law approach). 
154 E.g., Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958) (“Deductions are a matter of grace 
and Congress can, of course, disallow them as it chooses.”); Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm’r, 
319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943) (“[W]e examine the argument in the light of the now familiar rule that 
an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing 
the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.”); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 
U.S. 435, 440 (1934) (“Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon 
legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be 
allowed.”). 
155 358 U.S. 498 (1959). 
156 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
157 There were concurrences in both cases, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 
179–80 and 245–47. 
158 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
159 Id. at 529. 
160 See infra Part II.F.1–2. 
161 The canon of Supreme Court cases concerning the charitable tax benefits of the Code 
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own turf to the extent it is in the campaign finance arena. Although in 
Citizens United the Court showed a willingness to overturn settled 
law, they did so in an area of law—campaign finance—that 
undergoes constant legislative change and constitutional scrutiny, and 
arguably, was never all that settled. Further, the Court said that they 
were in effect forced into a controversial decision in order to resolve a 
split in their own precedents.
162
 Accordingly, it may be a much 
different matter institutionally to overturn a rule such as the Political 
Activities Prohibition—the context is completely different, 
notwithstanding the facial similarities to the impact on speech. 
C. Sanctions 
In deciding whether the Electioneering Rule was a burden on 
speech, the Court in Citizens United described certain actions that, if 
taken, would be subject to the Electioneering Rule:  
(1) The Sierra Club runs an ad within 60 days of a general 
election that tells the public to disapprove of a Congressman 
who supports logging in national forests;  
(2) The National Rifle Association publishes a book urging 
the public to vote against an incumbent Senator who supports 
a handgun ban; and  
(3) The American Civil Liberties Union creates a website 
endorsing a presidential candidate on free speech grounds.
163
  
Those examples, designed assuredly to highlight the outcome of the 
Electioneering Rule as censorship of the first order, are each also 
                                                                                                                 
 
are fairly sparse and wide ranging. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 
585 (1983) (holding that non-profit private schools that use religious doctrine to racially 
discriminate cannot qualify as a tax-exempt organization); TWR, 461 U.S. at 551 (granting 
substantial latitude to Congress for determining which groups can receive tax-exempt status); 
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970) (affirming New York statute 
permitting tax exempt status for religious organizations); Better Bus. Bureau of D.C., Inc. v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 279, 286 (1945) (refusing a tax exemption for an organization that 
primarily conducted business); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 582 
(1924) (affirming tax exempt status of an organization that directed profits towards science and 
education). 
162 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010) (“The Court is thus confronted with 
conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based 
on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”). But see id. at 938 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There was also the straightforward path: applying Austin and 
McConnell, just as the District Court did in holding that the funding of Citizens United’s film 
can be regulated under them. The only thing preventing the majority from affirming the District 
Court, or adopting a narrower ground that would retain Austin, is its disdain for Austin.”). 
163 Id. at 897. 
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likely to violate the Political Activities Prohibition if undertaken by 
charities. At first glance then, how can the Rule survive?  
The facial similarities between the Electioneering Rule and the 
Political Activities Prohibition diverge not just with respect to 
purpose but also when the consequences of violating either rule are 
taken into account. That the Electioneering Rule is overtly “backed by 
criminal sanctions” was clearly important to the Court.164 The above 
examples, the Court said, “would all be felonies.”165 And although the 
opinion asserted the importance of protecting the speech of 
corporations qua corporations, the corporation qua corporation does 
not go to jail for corporate violations. Rather, only natural persons, 
i.e., those who knowingly and willfully violate the Electioneering 
Rule, can go to jail.  
That the criminal sanction is important to the Court was evidenced 
by the repeated references to felonies or crimes throughout the 
Court’s opinion—appearing in each part except Part IV166 (the 
omission in Part IV is to be expected because Part IV upheld the 
constitutionality of the disclosure provisions). Indeed, the Court 
concluded in Part V that “it seems stranger than fiction for our 
Government to make this political speech a crime. Yet this is the 
statute’s purpose and design.”167 In other words, the criminalization of 
speech is a critical part of the campaign finance statutory and 
regulatory scheme and an important factor in the Court’s decision.  
As such, the Electioneering Rule’s sanction is an important basis 
for distinction with the Political Activities Prohibition. The 
prohibition often is referred to, somewhat redundantly, as 
                                                                                                                 
164 Id.  
165 Id. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A) (2006) (“Any person who knowingly and willfully 
commits a violation of any provision of this Act which involves the making, receiving, or 
reporting of any contribution, donation or expenditure” shall be fined or imprisoned or both.). 
166 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888 (noting that Citizens United “feared” that Hillary 
involved independent expenditures “thus subjecting the corporation to civil and criminal 
penalties”); id. at 889 (dismissing the ACLU’s argument as amici regarding how to interpret the 
electioneering communication definition in part because an inaccurate determination under their 
definition would “potentially subject[] the speaker to criminal sanctions”); id. at 895 (“[A] 
speaker who wants to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against 
FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak.”); id. at 897 
(“The law before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions.”); id. at 897 (noting that 
“[s]ection 441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy 
corporations” to engage in political speech); id. at 897 (giving examples of what would be a 
felony under section 441b); id. at 903 (noting that a violation of the Michigan law at issue in 
Austin “was punishable as a felony”); id. at 904 (“If the First Amendment has any force, it 
prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply 
engaging in political speech.”); id. at 908 (“When Government seeks to use its full power, 
including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what 
distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.”). 
167 Id. at 917. 
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“absolute,”168 meaning that a single instance of political activity 
violates the Rule. Violation is not, however, a felony. Rather, the 
consequence for violation is revocation of the organization’s 
charitable status.
169
 The organization also is barred from reorganizing 
as a tax-exempt social welfare organization under section 501(c)(4) of 
the Code.
170
  
In addition to revocation, if expenditures are involved in the 
political activity, excise taxes may be assessed.
171
 There is an excise 
tax on the organization equal to 10 percent of the expenditure (100 
percent if not corrected in a certain amount of time), and an excise tax 
on an organization manager equal to 2.5 percent of the expenditure 
(50 percent if the manager refused to agree to part or all of the 
correction) if the manager knowingly agreed to make the 
expenditure.
172
 Flagrant violations of the Rule may result in expedited 
enforcement action.
173
  
In short, the difference in consequence between the Electioneering 
Rule and the Political Activities Prohibition are significant. One 
                                                                                                                 
168 See Kindell & Reilly, supra note 40, at 352 (discussing Seventh and Second Circuit 
cases holding the prohibition to be absolute and noting that an organization violates it even if 
political participation is not a “substantial part” of the group’s overall activities). The reason for 
the redundancy is that words, especially in statutes, often do not mean what they seem to say. 
For example, section 501(c)(3) organizations must be “exclusively” organized and operated for 
exempt purposes. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). But “exclusively” turns out to mean “primarily” in 
the regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1 (as amended in 2008). This illustrates the need for 
emphasis when describing the Political Activities Prohibition as absolute—the statute really 
does mean what it says. Of course, this turns out not to be entirely correct either, as the recent 
IRS reports on enforcement of the Political Activities Prohibition demonstrate. See also IRS, 
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3–4 (2006) (reporting 
violations of the prohibition but no sanction). 
169 See IRS, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 
(2006) (indicating that sanctions for violating the prohibition are limited to fines and 
revocation). 
170 I.R.C. § 504(a). The inability to reorganize as a section 501(c)(4) organization does not 
apply to churches. Id. at § 504(c). The court in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 
142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cited this factor as part of its reasoning that the sanction, at least with 
respect to churches, was not especially onerous.  
171 I.R.C. § 4955. The text of section 4955 suggests that the excise tax is not an 
intermediate sanction, but rather is to be levied in addition to revocation of charitable status. The 
legislative history, however, sends mixed signals—it states that the sanction is not intended to 
weaken the absolute character of the prohibition, but also indicates that in certain limited cases, 
the IRS may have the discretion to use the excise tax in lieu of revocation. H.R. Rep. No. 100–
391, pt. 2, at 1624 (1987).  
172 I.R.C. § 4955. 
173 See I.R.C. § 6852(a) (providing that if a section 501(c)(3) organization flagrantly 
violates the prohibition against political expenditures, “the Secretary shall immediately make a 
determination of any income tax payable by such organization . . . and shall immediately make a 
determination of any tax payable under section 4955 by such organization”); I.R.C. § 7409 
(providing that if a section 501(c)(3) organization violates the prohibition on political 
expenditures and meets certain requirements, a civil action can be commenced to enjoin it from 
making any further expenditures). 
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makes speech a crime while the other makes speech a disqualification 
for an organization-level tax exemption and possibly exposes the 
organization and its managers to monetary penalties if expenditures 
are involved. Measured as a form of suppression, the Electioneering 
Rule’s direct threat of criminal sanctions likely suppresses the speech 
of many, in accordance with its design, while the threat of loss of tax 
exemption, though important, is of a different order. 
D. A Ban on Speech  
A third factor important to the Citizens United Court was its 
characterization of the Electioneering Rule as a ban on speech. The 
Court said that the Electioneering Rule is a ban “notwithstanding the 
fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak.”174 The Court 
noted that a “PAC is a separate association from the corporation.”175 
Therefore, the Court said, the availability of the option to speak 
through a PAC does not allow the corporation to speak.
176
 Setting 
aside the implications of the assertion that a PAC is a separate 
association, the point the Court made is quite clear and dovetails with 
its concern that corporations as corporations are worthy of protection. 
In effect, what the Court was saying is that speech of the 
corporation’s PAC is not the same as speech by the corporation, and 
therefore, the ban is a ban. 
The Citizens United Court’s conclusion that the Electioneering 
Rule was a “ban on speech,”177 despite the availability of a PAC-
speech option, appears to have rather ominous implications for the 
Political Activities Prohibition and other tax rules limiting the 
lobbying and political activity of charities and other exempt 
organizations. Since the Court’s 1983 decision in TWR, it has been 
                                                                                                                 
174 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010). “PAC” is short for political action 
committee.  
175 Id. (emphasis added). 
176 Id. And even if it did, the Court said that the formation of a PAC is a burdensome 
alternative as “they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.” Id. The 
Court cited the fact that “every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the treasurer 
promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making donations, preserve 
receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this information 
within 10 days” in addition to filing detailed monthly reports with the FEC and that “PACs have 
to comply with these regulations just to speak.” Id. It is hard to know what to make of the 
Court’s burden argument in an exempt organization context. The reporting obligations of 
section 527 organizations that are not political committees, and so not subject to FEC rules, 
mirror the FEC requirements. I.R.C. § 527(j) (2006). A political organization too must comply 
with very similar regulations “just to speak.” The implication is that record-keeping and 
ongoing reporting rules may be unconstitutional. But this part of the Court’s opinion appears to 
be dicta, as the Court merely adds the burden argument after it already has concluded that the 
PAC option is not a sufficient alternative. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897. 
177 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.  
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commonly understood that segregating speech by use of a PAC or an 
affiliated organization was an important means to inoculate a rule 
affecting speech from a constitutional challenge. Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion in TWR referred to such an alternate channel 
approvingly.
178
 Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in TWR (joined by 
two other Justices) was based on the availability of the affiliate 
structure, and the fact that the IRS did not require more than separate 
incorporation and minimal record keeping to ensure that tax-
deductible contributions were not used for lobbying.
179
 Indeed, the 
one court to consider (and uphold) the constitutionality of the 
Political Activities Prohibition cited TWR, concluding that a section 
501(c)(3) organization had a suitable alternate channel for political 
activity because a section 501(c)(3) organization could set up an 
affiliated section 501(c)(4) organization, which in turn could establish 
a related PAC or political organization to conduct political activity.
180
 
Of course, the section 501(c)(3) organization must take steps to 
ensure that the political activities of the PAC are not attributable to 
the section 501(c)(3) organization. 
Thus, the Court’s statement in Citizens United that a PAC is a 
separate association insufficient to speak for the corporation is hard to 
square with the Court’s statements about alternate channels in the tax 
context. Indeed, directly applying the Court’s statements to the tax 
context seems to go against separate incorporation as a panacea. 
Rather, it seems to require that the speech of any separate but related 
organization be attributable to the original organization.  
One possibility is that the Court’s thinking on alternate channels in 
the tax context has quite simply changed. If so, however, it does not 
necessarily follow that the Political Activities Prohibition (and for 
that matter the lobbying limitation) is suddenly unconstitutional. The 
presence of a sufficient alternate channel seems to be part of the 
constitutional analysis.
181
 But the extent to which an alternate channel 
for speech was necessary given Congress’s broad power to make 
subsidy decisions has never been clear.
182
  
                                                                                                                 
178 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
179 Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
180 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
181 See Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 100, 113–17 (2007) (noting that in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), and several district and appellate court cases, the 
existence of an alternate channel for lobbying is seen as important to the reasoning of TWR). 
182 Professor Galston explained that subsequent courts have pointed to an alternate channel 
analysis. Id. But the presence or absence of an alternate channel seems more like a factor to be 
considered when analyzing whether a rule burdens speech than a rule of constitutional law. 
Perhaps the most important point here is that the majority opinion in TWR noted but did not 
emphasize the alternate channel. 461 U.S. at 544. 
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Further, the Court’s statement regarding the insufficiency of PACs 
is perhaps best viewed in connection with the nature of the 
Electioneering Rule as a ban on corporate-level speech. Under such a 
rule, the corporation as corporation was simply prevented (under 
threat of criminal sanction) from speaking. But it is different for 
section 501(c)(3) organizations. The Political Activities Prohibition 
does not prevent the organization from speaking as such (that is, the 
prohibition is not an entity-level rule); rather it prevents the 
organization from speaking as a section 501(c)(3) organization.  
This is not just a matter of semantics. The distinction between an 
entity-level rule and a tax classification-level rule may be significant 
for the alternate channel analysis under the First Amendment. In the 
tax context, the “organization” can be viewed more broadly than the 
tax classification, that is, the several tax-exemption provisions work 
as a whole to provide for organization or entity-level speech for tax 
purposes.
183
 The question is whether there is some way for the 
organization to speak, if not as a section 501(c)(3) organization, then 
as something else like a social welfare organization or a PAC.
184
 
Thus, a section 501(c)(3) should not be viewed in isolation but in 
connection with other tax-exemption provisions.
185
 Under the 
Electioneering Rule, there was no similar alternate structure available, 
because the ban was an organization-level ban. In other words, the 
Court in the past has not, and even in the future might not, view a 
PAC or a social welfare organization as “separate” for purposes of an 
alternate channel analysis in the tax-exempt organization context. 
E. Identity Discrimination  
Citizens United is notable for its elevation of the corporate form as 
worthy of virtually the same First Amendment protection as 
individuals. The Court said: 
[T]he Government may commit a constitutional wrong when 
by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the 
right to speak from some and giving it to others, the 
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the 
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and 
                                                                                                                 
183 See, e.g., Galston, supra note 181, at 103 (discussing, throughout the article, a 
“network” approach to political activity by tax-exempt organizations). 
184 See infra Part III for additional discussion of the sufficiency of the alternate channel 
with respect to political activities. 
185 See also supra Part II.B.2 (arguing the the tax-exemption system as a whole must be 
taken into account in determining the purpose of section 501(c)(3) and the Political Activities 
Prohibition). 
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respect for the speaker’s voice. The Government may not by 
these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to 
determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of 
consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and 
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.
186
 
The Court concluded that corporations, as corporations, have a 
viewpoint and a right to speak.
187
 Thus, the Electioneering Rule 
wrongfully singled out the corporation for speech suppression.  
Once again, on its face, the tenor of the Court’s words strongly 
suggest that the Political Activities Prohibition is problematic. If 
Congress shall make no law singling out certain groups to suppress 
their speech, then surely, in adding the Political Activities Prohibition 
to section 501(c)(3) in 1954, Congress targeted section 501(c)(3) 
organizations for speech suppression just as surely as the 
Electioneering Rule singled out corporations and barred their speech.  
Yet it is not so straightforward. As a ban on corporate speech, the 
Electioneering Rule applies at the entity level.
188
 The corporate form 
is generic and a creature of state law. Corporations can and do have 
many purposes and functions. The corporate form is an archetype of 
essential legal forms and is considered a “person” for many 
purposes.
189
 In short, the corporation is a foundational category of the 
legal system. Whether or not one agrees that corporations should have 
the same speech rights as natural persons, it seems indisputable that 
the corporate form organizationally is fundamental and that a rule 
targeting the speech of a corporation is directed at a core identity of 
the legal system. 
By contrast, section 501(c)(3)
190
 is a creature of federal tax law—a 
tax classification
191—and not an organizational form. The purposes of 
a section 501(c)(3) organization are not generic but limited. Because 
so many organizations take advantage of the tax classification, there 
are of course many section 501(c)(3) organizations,
192
 and section 
                                                                                                                 
186 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010). 
187 Id. at 913. 
188 See supra Part II.D (discussing the entity speech prohibition of the Electioneering 
Rule). 
189 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and 
include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.”). 
190 Section 501(c)(3) applies to “[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or 
foundation.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
191 As a general rule, Congress’ tax classifications enjoy a ‘“presumption of 
constitutionality’” that ‘“can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a 
classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.’” 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) (quoting Madden v. 
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)). 
192 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (noting that there are more than 1.5 million 
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501(c)(3) organizations certainly form an important part of the 
economy and society. But the widespread use of section 501(c)(3) 
does not change its character as a tax classification. As such, the 
Political Activities Prohibition does not target the speech of section 
501(c)(3) organizations as organizations as did the Electioneering 
Rule. Rather, the Political Activities Prohibition is a condition to 
receive a particular tax status, not a prohibition directed to the 
organization per se.
193
 Thus, importantly, although section 501(c)(3) 
status formally does not survive political speech, the entity retains its 
identity as a corporation (assuming it was so organized) and may 
speak. In short, the Political Activities Prohibition is best viewed as a 
condition of a tax classification and not an identity-based restriction, 
at least not in the same sense of the Electioneering Rule. Concluding 
otherwise would extend the Court’s concern about identity-based 
bans on speech beyond the entity level to cover other, arguably lesser, 
identities such as tax classifications. In other words, if a tax 
classification has the same First Amendment standing as the more 
generic legal concept of a corporation, it is not clear where the 
identity line stops, making speech-based, and perhaps other, 
distinctions because of tax status problematic. 
F. Existing Jurisprudence Supports the Political Activities 
Prohibition 
On the surface there is language in Citizens United that suggests 
existential (neigh constitutional) peril for the Political Activities 
Prohibition. At one point, the Court said bluntly: “No sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of 
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”194 Facially, there appears to be 
no contest: a charity typically is a nonprofit corporation and the 
Political Activities Prohibition is a limit on political speech and 
therefore, the prohibition is unconstitutional. But, as argued above, 
such a conclusion is too quick.  
                                                                                                                 
 
registered charities, excluding churches).  
193 It is an interesting question whether a state, in response to Citizens United, could amend 
its corporate code to impose an independent expenditure prohibition as a condition of corporate 
existence (presumably on a going forward basis). Even though states may be unlikely to do this, 
such a prohibition would still seem to run afoul of Citizens United. Unlike a condition on a tax 
classification, violation of such a condition would terminate the corporate existence altogether, 
which, given the Court’s support for the corporate legal form per se, would likely be an 
unconstitutional result. 
194 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
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Purpose, sanction, and a ban on corporate speech are the factors 
that moved the Court in Citizens United to conclude that the 
Electioneering Rule was a burden on speech and therefore that strict 
scrutiny applied.
195
 With respect to each factor, the hypothetical Our 
Country and the Political Activities Prohibition is distinguishable 
from Citizens United and the Electioneering Rule.
196
 The purpose of 
the Political Activities Prohibition is not to suppress speech, but to 
define charity; the legal setting is tax and not campaign finance; 
violation of the Political Activities Prohibition is not criminal; the 
Political Activities Prohibition is by nature a rule associated with a 
tax status (with, or without, a sufficient alternate channel) rather than 
a ban on corporate speech. These comparisons form the funnel 
through which the initial and most important conclusion will be 
made: Is the Political Activities Prohibition a burden on speech? As 
shown above, on each factor, Citizens United is distinguishable from 
Our Country.
197
 
Furthermore, the Court would not decide Our Country in a legal 
vacuum. The Court previously has concluded, twice, in Cammarano 
and TWR, that a restriction that affects speech in connection with a 
tax benefit does not burden speech.
198
 The Court, however, also 
concluded the opposite in Speiser.
199
 Accordingly, even though 
plausible arguments can be made distinguishing Our Country from 
Citizens United, Our Country must be positioned within existing 
Supreme Court jurisprudence of Speiser, Cammarano, and TWR. 
1. The Rules of Speiser, Cammarano, and TWR. 
Chronologically, Speiser is the first of the decisions, and the 
outlier. At issue was a provision of the California constitution, which 
provided a property tax exemption to veterans.
200
 In order to claim the 
exemption, veterans were required to complete a standard application 
form which included the following oath: “I do not advocate the 
overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of 
                                                                                                                 
195 See supra text accompanying note 121. 
196 See supra Parts II.B–D. 
197 See supra Parts II.B–D. 
198 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (“Congress 
has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity. 
Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”); Cammarano v. United States, 
358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (“Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they 
engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to pay for those 
activities entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is 
required to do under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.”). 
199 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (“To deny an exemption to claimants who 
engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.”). 
200 Id. at 514–15. 
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California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate 
the support of a foreign government against the United States in event 
of hostilities.”201 The Court acknowledged that “[i]t is settled that 
speech can be effectively limited by the exercise of the taxing power” 
but held that “[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engaged in 
certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such 
speech.”202 Additionally, the Court said that “the denial of a tax 
exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the 
effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech. 
The denial is ‘frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas.’”203 Accordingly, the Court held that the loyalty oath was an 
unconstitutional condition of a tax exemption.
204
 
By contrast, one year later, in Cammarano, the Court considered 
the validity of a Treasury Regulation (now codified in section 162(e) 
of the Code) that disallowed a deduction for ordinary and necessary 
business expenses if the expense was for lobbying.
205
 Although like 
Speiser, a rule of tax had the effect of limiting speech, the Court 
unanimously concluded that “Speiser ha[d] no relevance.”206 The 
petitioners in Cammarano, the Court said were “not being denied a 
tax deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected 
activities, but are simply being required to pay for those activities 
entirely out of their own pockets.”207 Accordingly, a Speiser-
Cammarano dichotomy emerged: Is the rule “aimed at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas,”208 or is it just a decision not to 
subsidize a protected activity? If the former, then there is a burden on 
speech; if the latter, there is no burden. 
In the 1983 decision, TWR, the Court considered whether 
conditioning tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Code on 
refraining from substantial lobbying activity was constitutional.
209
 
The Court said that the unconstitutional condition model of Speiser 
was not the right one:  
The Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible 
contributions to support its non-lobbying activity, nor does it 
deny TWR any independent benefit on account of its 
                                                                                                                 
201 Id. at 515. 
202 Id. at 518 (citations omitted). 
203 Id. at 519 (quoting Am. Comm’ns Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)). 
204 Id. at 529. 
205 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 499–500 (1959). 
206 Id. at 513. 
207 Id. 
208 Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519 (quoting Am. Comm’ns Assn., 339 U.S. at 402) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
209 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 541 (1983). 
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intention to lobby. Congress has merely refused to pay for the 
lobbying out of public moneys. This Court has never held that 
Congress must grant a benefit such as TWR claims here to a 
person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right.
210
 
Noting that it would be a different case if the rule was “aim[ed] at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas,”211 the Court found “no indication 
that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any 
demonstration that it has had that effect.”212 Accordingly, the Court 
said the case was controlled by Cammarano and upheld the lobbying 
rule.
213
  
2. The Speiser-Cammarano-TWR Trilogy Discussed. 
This trilogy of cases requires some discussion. Notably, because 
Speiser came first, the Court in Cammarano and TWR had to 
articulate a distinction, which the Court did, but in a somewhat 
conclusory fashion. The key statement in Cammarano, that 
“[p]etitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they 
engage in constitutionally protected activities,”214 seems in one sense 
incorrect. From the petitioners’ standpoint, it appears that they are 
being denied a tax deduction because of a special rule that targets 
constitutionally protected activities. Were it not for the rule, a 
deduction generally would be available. Similarly, Justice Rehnquist’s 
statement in TWR quoted above that the statute “does not deny TWR 
the right to receive deductible contributions to support its non-
lobbying activity” or “deny TWR any independent benefit on account 
of its intention to lobby”215 is very hard to make sense of on its terms. 
The Code does deny TWR the right to receive deductible 
contributions if TWR lobbies to a substantial extent. Further, the 
Code does deny TWR an independent benefit—that of tax 
exemption—if TWR intends to substantially lobby.216  
                                                                                                                 
210 Id. at 545. 
211 Id. at 548 (quotations and citations omitted). 
212 Id. Arguably, this statement may provide a footing for an as-applied challenge to the 
Political Activities Prohibition. The reference to the “effect” of the provision invites an 
argument that the result of the Rule has been to suppress ideas. 
213 Id. at 546. 
214 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959). 
215 461 U.S. at 545. 
216 In his concurrence in TWR, Justice Blackmun specifically notes this part of Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion and says that it can only make sense if the alternate structure of unlimited 
lobbying through an affiliated organization is permitted. Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
In such a case, TWR can continue to be eligible to receive deductible contributions with respect 
to its non-lobbying activity and get the benefit of charitable exemption, notwithstanding the 
lobbying of a controlled affiliate. 
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Nevertheless, although the Court’s statements in Cammarano and 
TWR are not clear explanations of the Court’s reasoning, there is an 
important and controlling, if somewhat fuzzy, distinction drawn with 
Speiser: the purpose of the law. Really, the statements quoted in 
Cammarano and TWR are the Court’s effort to state that the rules of 
the federal tax code had a different purpose from the state rule at issue 
in Speiser and that the difference was constitutionally significant. 
Yes, speech is burdened as a practical matter in each case, but only in 
Speiser was the purpose of the rule to burden speech, i.e., it was 
“‘frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”217 
To see this, further discussion of Speiser is necessary. One aspect 
of Speiser that is often overlooked is that the Court assumed without 
deciding that California had the power to “deny tax exemptions to 
persons who engage in the proscribed speech for which they might be 
fined or imprisoned.”218 Thus, the Court did not address the question 
of the constitutionality of the loyalty oath as a condition of property 
tax exemption as such. Instead, the Court invalidated the oath on 
procedural due process grounds because the method California used 
to enforce the oath was unfair.
219
  
In Speiser, the Court was moved because the California law in 
effect was established to force veterans to prove a substantive 
question: namely, their loyalty to the regime.
220
 Merely signing the 
oath was not enough to satisfy the burden; rather, it was “but a part of 
the probative process by which the State [sought] to determine which 
taxpayers [fell] into the proscribed category.”221 And the State could 
subpoena applications and investigate whether the veterans were 
“proper persons” to qualify for tax exemption.222 The Court likened 
the loyalty oath and its process of proof to a legislature declaring a 
person guilty of a crime, and then making them prove their 
innocence.
223
 Thus, “[t]he question for decision . . . [was] whether this 
allocation of the burden of proof” met due process demands.224 
Although putting the burden on the taxpayer normally raises no 
concerns, the Court found that this case was different because “the 
purported tax was shown to be in reality a penalty for a crime,”225 
                                                                                                                 
217 Speiser v. Randall, 357, U.S. 513, 519 (1957) (quoting Am. Comm’ns Assn. v. Douds, 
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)). 
218 Id. at 520. 
219 Id. at 529.  
220 Id. at 528. 
221 Id. at 522. 
222 Id. at 521–22. 
223 Id. at 523–24. 
224 Id. at 523. 
225 Id. at 525. 
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and, as the Court had noted earlier, the speech in question here was a 
crime.
226
 In such a case, greater procedural safeguards are required 
“than when only the amount of [the taxpayer’s] tax liability is in 
issue.”227  
In sum, what the State of California attempted by the loyalty oath 
was to establish through the tax exemption system a method to flush 
out potential criminals. The law was a direct attempt to suppress the 
speech of a particular class of persons. This was its purpose. But there 
would be a different result, the Court said, if the “purpose was to 
achieve an objective other than restraint on speech.”228 
The contrast to the Political Activities Prohibition and lobbying 
limitations of sections 501(c)(3) and 162(e) is notable. Perhaps, in the 
Court’s view, the self-evident nature of the contrast explains the 
Court’s fairly conclusory approach to distinguishing Speiser in both 
cases. As discussed above, Congress’s purpose for the tax rules is not 
related directly to speech.
229
 As the Court said in Cammarano, the 
nondeductibility of lobbying expenses is a “sharply defined national 
policy,”230 a provision of general applicability, extant for “more than 
40 years.”231 Additionally, it said that “[n]ondiscriminatory denial of 
deduction . . . is plainly not ‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas.’”232 Regarding the lobbying limitation on section 501(c)(3) 
status, the Court said in TWR: “Congress has not infringed any First 
Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity. 
Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”233 Also, 
it said that “Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying as extensively 
as it chose to subsidize other activities that nonprofit organizations 
undertake to promote the public welfare.”234  
Arguably beyond dispute is that the key distinction between 
Cammarano and Speiser is the purpose of the law. In Speiser, the 
State set out to deny speech. But, the Court in Cammarano said that 
Congress had a revenue purpose in mind when enacting the lobbying 
limitations of sections 162(e) and 501(c)(3).
235
 Thus, the otherwise 
somewhat cryptic statements above in Cammarano about not denying 
                                                                                                                 
226 Id. at 519. 
227 Id. at 525. 
228 Id. at 527. 
229 See supra Part II.B.1. 
230 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 508 (1959). The Court said this twice. The 
second time it incorporates the non-subvention/no subsidy rationale of Slee v. Commissioner. Id. 
at 512 (citing Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d. Cir. 1930)). 
231 Id. at 508. 
232 Id. at 513 (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519). 
233 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983). 
234 Id. at 544. 
235 See id. at 546 (noting that “Congress has simply chosen not to pay for . . . lobbying”). 
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benefits or rights but merely refusing to pay for lobbying are really 
just the Court’s affirmations of an accepted congressional purpose.  
Speiser is also distinguishable from the hypothetical Our Country 
in other important ways. Applying the constitutional conditions 
doctrine in Speiser, the Court intimates that the loyalty oath bore no 
relation to the benefit provided, i.e., the oath was “external” to the 
benefit.
236
 By contrast, the Political Activities Prohibition (and the 
lobbying limitation) is a condition that is “internal” to the benefit, or 
rationally related to it. In other words, demanding loyalty has nothing 
intrinsically to do with providing a property tax exemption. But 
demanding nonpartisanship is related to determining the type of 
benefit to be provided, e.g., delivery of charitable or educational 
goods and services without the distraction of partisan politics. In 
addition, Speiser, like Citizens United, also appeared to qualify as an 
identity-based speech restriction. The loyalty oath applied to veterans. 
A veteran is a veteran is a veteran—“though he be denied a tax 
exemption, he remains a veteran.”237 Thus, the Court stressed that 
California had singled out veterans, and conditioned their speech.
238
 
By contrast, section 501(c)(3) organizations are a creature of the tax 
code, and the condition is related to that tax status. That is, if a section 
501(c)(3) organization be denied a tax exemption, it remains an 
organization.  
In sum, under the Speiser-Cammarano-TWR dichotomy, purpose 
arguably is the most significant factor in determing whether a rule (be 
it a condition or not) burdens speech. Although Speiser involved a 
condition to exemption (the loyalty oath), this condition has a 
different purpose from the federal conditions relating to exemption 
and lobbying. The hypothetical Our Country, distinguishable from 
Citizens United on the key factors of purpose, sanction, and a ban on 
the corporate form, fits squarely in the Cammarano-TWR line. Under 
this line, the Court is likely to conclude that the Political Activities 
Prohibition is not a burden on speech. A case from the campaign 
finance context, Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCFL”),239 underlines this point. In MCFL, 
Justice Brennan easily concluded in discussing TWR, that the 
lobbying restriction of section 501(c)(3) “would infringe no protected 
activity, for there is no right to have speech subsidized by the 
Government.”240 Accordingly, despite the fact that the Electioneering 
                                                                                                                 
236 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527–28 (1957). 
237 Id. at 528. 
238 Id. 
239 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
240 Id. at 256 n.9. Justice Brennan here confirmed that although, as a practical matter, the 
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Rule and the Political Activities Prohibition have the effect of 
suppressing speech, the two rules may nonetheless fairly be 
characterized as involving in one case but not the other a burden of a 
fundamental right.
241
 
III. CAUTIONARY NOTES AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHARITABLE 
DEDUCTION 
The analysis in Part II of this Article is intended to show that as a 
matter of law the Court in deciding Our Country could and should 
distinguish Citizens United, follow the established Cammarano-TWR 
model, and hold that the Political Activities Prohibition is consistent 
with the Constitution. That said, there are enough facial similarities 
between the Electioneering Rule and the Political Activities 
Prohibition, and questions raised by the case law, potentially to tip the 
scales on the fairly nuanced inquiry into whether a rule burdens 
speech for First Amendment purposes. Or, in the alternative, perhaps 
the Court could be led to conclude that the Political Activities 
Prohibition can survive a facial challenge, but not an as-applied 
challenge. This Part examines factors that perhaps could lead the 
Court to such conclusions. As argued below, however, even if the 
Court took either approach, the impact would be slight. This is 
because a separate constitutional analysis is required for the Political 
Activities Prohibition for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) and 
for tax deduction under section 170. Any possible constitutional 
infirmities that may exist with respect to section 501(c)(3) do not 
exist with respect to section 170. 
                                                                                                                 
 
Political Activities Prohibition affects speech, it does not follow as a legal conclusion that it is a 
rule that “suppresses speech” as such, rather, it suppresses subsidized speech. 
241 Furthermore, even if the Court concluded that the Political Activities Prohibition was a 
burden on speech, and that strict scrutiny applied, there is still a case to be made that defining 
charity as exclusive of political activity serves a compelling state interest. See Steffen N. 
Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the 
Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875, 890 (2001) (discussing the 
possible justification that a limited charity definition serves the State’s interest in not compelling 
taxpayers to subsidize political speech). Although it is outside the scope of this article to make 
such a case, for all the reasons discussed above, plus the additional loss of revenue to the 
Treasury, and the difficulty administering any alternative scheme, see infra Part IV, the status 
quo is defensible as a compelling policy with an indirect effect on speech. But see Houck, supra 
note 25, at 86 (arguing that “we limit charities in politics because we don’t believe in our gut 
that they belong there”). 
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A. Purpose to Penalize Speech  
Justice Douglas’ concurrence in Speiser highlights one fault line. 
In Speiser, Justice Douglas emphasized his agreement with the Court 
that the loyalty oath was problematic because it placed an 
unacceptable burden on citizens to prove their loyalty, contrary to the 
presumption of innocence.
242
 But he also expressed a concern that if 
the California rule was aimed “not to apprehend criminals but to 
penalize advocacy, it likewise must fall.”243 To the extent the 
hypothetical Our Country Court views the Political Activities 
Prohibition not as a decision not to subsidize speech, but rather as an 
effort to penalize advocacy, this argument could carry greater force.  
The main support for such a view would likely come from the 
direct legislative history of the Political Activities Prohibition. 
Certainly, the circumstantial evidence of its enactment suggests that 
Senator Johnson shoved through the prohibition in response to an 
electoral attack by a putative charitable organization.
244
 But, as argued 
in Part I of this Article, the better view of the Rule is to acknowledge 
it as the codification of a decision that was decades in the making, 
one that largely confirmed initial instincts that the meaning of charity 
is nonpolitical and education does not include propaganda. Further, as 
argued in Part II.B.2 of this Article, Congress’s treatment of advocacy 
generally under the Code’s tax-exempt organization provisions 
suggests that penalizing advocacy is not a purpose of the tax 
treatment. 
B. The Penalty Effect and the Charitable Deduction: Significance and 
Sufficiency of an Alternate Channel 
Another strand of concern identified by Justice Douglas, this time 
through his concurring opinion in Cammarano, is whether a rule 
might operate, irrespective of its purpose, to penalize speech.
245
 
Recall that Cammarano concerned the constitutionality of denying a 
business expense deduction for lobbying. Justice Douglas said that, 
for him, Cammarano would be a different case if the result of a 
taxpayer’s lobbying was that the taxpayer lost all deductions for 
ordinary and necessary business expenses.
246
 This would be to 
“plac[e] a penalty on the exercise of First Amendment rights,” which 
                                                                                                                 
242 357 U.S. at 535 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Alexander Hamilton and the role 
loyalty oaths played in sparking Revolution). 
243 Id. 
244 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
245 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring).  
246 Id.  
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he said “was in substance what [California] did in Speiser.”247 
Although to a certain extent, the question of whether a rule has a 
punitive purpose or a penalty effect may overlap, a rule could be 
enacted with innocent intentions but punitive results and perhaps be 
unconstitutional on that basis alone. Accordingly, the Political 
Activities Prohibition should be analyzed from the perspective of a 
penalty effect.  
The penalty effect could be an issue for purposes of tax exemption 
under section 501(c)(3) because the “taxpayer,” i.e., the organization, 
loses the entire benefit of exemption even for minor or insubstantial 
violations.
248
 This aspect of the political activity and lobbying rules
249
 
has led some commentators to conclude that, either as a matter of 
policy or as a matter of constitutional necessity, the lobbying and 
political activity rules should be changed.
250
 As Justice Douglas 
argued, if the Political Activities Prohibition serves as a penalty for 
speech, then it may fit the Speiser model.
251
 To put a label on the 
argument, the Rule would be an unconstitutional condition of tax-
exempt status.  
One answer to this concern has been through the alternate channel 
analysis,
252
 namely that the penalty effect is avoided because of the 
availability of an alternate channel for speech.
 
This was the argument 
made by Justice Blackmun’s concurrence and to a lesser extent the 
majority in TWR.
253
 But TWR concerned the lobbying limit of section 
                                                                                                                 
247 Id. Of course, the penalty effect (losing all business deductions) was not an issue in 
Cammarano because the disallowance rule affected only lobbying expenses and not other trade 
or business expenses. Id. 
248 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the IRS should 
allow charities greater leeway when enforcing the Political Activities Prohibition).  
249 There is more flexibility in the lobbying context. See Charles E. Hodges II & Edward 
M. Manigault, Political Activity and Lobbying by Charities: How Far Can it Go? What are the 
Risks?, 93 J. TAX’N 177, 179 (2000) (“Unlike the absolute prohibition on political intervention, a 
charity may, to a certain extent, be involved in activities intended to influence legislation.”). 
Organizations (other than churches) can opt-out of the facts and circumstances “no substantial 
part” test and make an election under section 501(h), which offers more precision on the amount 
of lobbying allowed and on the sanction. Id. at 180. As discussed above, the penalty for any 
political activity formally is loss of exemption, though the IRS exercises considerable discretion 
in this regard.  
250 See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 362–63 (proposing more carefully tailored rules about 
the prohibition on campaign intervention for charitable organizations); Benjamin M. Leff, “Sit 
Down and Count the Cost”: A Framework for Constitutionally Enforcing the 501(c)(3) 
Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 673, 677–79 (2009) (arguing that the Political 
Activities Prohibition for charitable organizations is likely unconstitutional and proposing an 
enforcement paradigm). 
251 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
252 See supra Part II.D for a discussion of the alternate channel analysis. Another answer to 
the question of the penalty effect may simply be one of judgment. The purpose of the law to 
define charity and the tax context for the law may alone be sufficient to conclude that alternate 
channel or not, there is no penalty effect involved. 
253 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (discussing the TWR opinions). 
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501(c)(3), and as commentators have noted, in general, the alternate 
channel available for lobbying is more permissive than the alternate 
channel available for political activity.
254
 Nevertheless, the D.C. 
Circuit in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, upheld the constitutionality 
of the Political Activities Prohibition by invoking affiliations of 
section 501(c)(3), section 501(c)(4), and section 527 organizations as 
a sufficient alternate channel.
255
 
Accordingly, assuming that an alternate channel is still useful for 
constitutional purposes,
256
 the question is the sufficiency of the 
alternate channel upheld in Branch Ministries. The general criticism 
would be that the multi-step structure of Branch Ministries (three 
entities instead of two)
257
 is a burden or dilutes the speech. Arguably, 
because the Court has approved a separate entity alternate channel 
approach before and there is no contrary authority, the addition of the 
section 527 layer is not a constitutional impediment.
258
 
Notwithstanding the Court’s statements in Citizens United regarding 
the burden of establishing a PAC,
259
 as argued above, the tax context 
here should be distinguishable.
260
  
In addition, to the extent that more or different channels are 
needed, a reviewing court should consider the option of an alternate 
channel through an affiliated for-profit corporation. Commentators—
                                                                                                                 
254 See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 325 (noting that charitable organizations “may establish 
and control a sister organization under section 501(c)(4), which imposes no restrictions on 
lobbying”). This is because unlimited lobbying may be conducted through an affiliated section 
501(c)(4) organization, but not unlimited political activity because section 501(c)(4) 
organizations may not allow political activity to become a primary purpose. Treas. Reg. § 
1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990). 
255 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
256 As noted above, the Court disapproved of the PAC alternate channel for corporate 
independent expenditures in Citizens United. But the Court’s derogation in Citizens United of 
the PAC alternate channel should be seen in the context of the Court’s concern about the 
Electioneering Rule as a ban on corporate speech. See supra Part II.D. The Political Activities 
Prohibition is not such a ban.  
257 211 F.3d at 143. 
258 See Galston, supra note 12, at 911 (concluding that such a structure does not impose a 
burden). 
259 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010) (“PACs are burdensome 
alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations”). 
260 Discussion about the presence or absence of alternate channels emphasizes again the 
usefulness of viewing the statutory scheme of the exemption provisions as a whole—as a 
network. See Galston, supra note 181, at 103 (discussing, throughout the article, a “network” 
approach to political activity by tax-exempt organizations). This provides a way of 
accommodating organization-level speech among different tax categories. See supra text 
accompanying note 183. If the default position is free speech and a taxable organization, then, 
when the organization utilizes the exemption system, both positions change at the choice of the 
organization. The organization is tax-exempt and the ability to speak as a for-profit entity may 
be affected. The different exemption categories and ability to own for-profit and nonprofit 
affiliates are boxes for how to treat different activities of the same, albeit formally separate, 
organization for tax purposes. 
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and the Court in TWR—have focused on tax-exempt affiliates because 
this was the structure used in TWR, and is the one most commonly 
employed. But if speech is the concern, the for-profit alternate 
channel generally is available.
261
  
One objection might be that a section 501(c)(3) organization does 
not have the option of establishing a for-profit affiliate to engage in 
political activity for the same reason that a section 501(c)(3) 
organization may not directly set up a section 527 organization.
262
 
The barrier here is the legislative history to the 1974 section 527 
legislation, which said that a section 501(c)(3) organization may not 
have an affiliated political organization.
263
 If the Court did decide, 
however, to rest the decision on an alternate channel, one avenue 
might be to mandate a simplified structure, for example, free the IRS 
from the 1974 legislative history and specifically allow the 
affiliation.
264
 
Thus, up to this point, there are plausible arguments for concluding 
that the Political Activities Prohibition does not have a penalty effect. 
However, one overlooked aspect of the alternate channel that was 
cited with approval in TWR may also be relevant; namely, that use of 
an affiliated section 501(c)(4) organization does not in fact allow for 
unfettered speech.
265
 This is because unlimited lobbying activity by a 
section 501(c)(4) organization is permitted only if the lobbying 
activity is related to the organization’s social welfare purpose.266 But 
unrelated lobbying activity, if it is a substantial purpose of the 
organization, does result in loss of section 501(c)(4) status.
267
 
                                                                                                                 
261 Indeed, the Code explicitly contemplates tax-exempt organizations owning for profit 
organizations and provides for the appropriate tax treatment. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(13) (2006) 
(providing special rules for amounts received from controlled entities). 
262 There is an exception for activity related to affecting a judicial nomination. See supra 
note 139. 
263 S. Rep. No. 93–1357, at 30 (1974) (noting that section 527 was “not intended to affect 
in any way the prohibition against certain exempt organizations (e.g., section 501(c)(3)) 
engaging in ‘electioneering’”).  
264 Nothing statutorily appears to prevent the IRS from allowing such a structure, but 
nonetheless, with legislative history to the contrary, the IRS is unlikely to change current 
practice without clear direction from a higher authority.  
265 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 561 U.S. 540, 543 (1983) (emphasis 
added) (“Section 501(c)(4) organizations . . . are permitted to engage in substantial lobbying to 
advance their exempt purposes.”). 
266 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006) (“[O]rganizations not organized for profit but operated 
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare . . . and the net earnings of which are devoted 
exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.”). 
267 See Rev. Rul. 2004–6, 2004–1 C.B. 328 (“Organizations that are exempt from federal 
income tax under § 501(a) as organizations described in § 501(c)(4) . . . may, consistent with 
their exempt purpose, publicly advocate positions on public policy issues.”); Rev. Rul. 81–95, 
1981–1 C.B. 332 (“Thus, an organization may carry on lawful political activities and remain 
exempt under section 501(c)(4) as long as it is primarily engaged in activities that promote 
social welfare.”). 
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Accordingly, the section 501(c)(3) organization’s section 501(c)(4) 
alternate channel is an unrestricted alternate only to the extent of the 
relatedness of the lobbying to the exempt purpose of the 
organization.
268
  
There is no indication that this issue was directly considered by the 
Court in TWR. The question then is whether the First Amendment in 
the tax-exempt organization context is concerned with a related-
unrelated distinction or, instead, is concerned with speech as speech, 
related or not. If a related-unrelated distinction has significance for 
the First Amendment, then consistent with the TWR alternate channel 
(which protected only related lobbying), a sufficient alternate channel 
for political activities need be only for related political activity.
269
 If, 
however, the First Amendment does not take into account tax 
concerns, then assuming that an alternate structure is constitutionally 
significant, one issue relevant for both the lobbying limitation and the 
Political Activities Prohibition, is the extent to which an unrestricted 
outlet for the speech—related or not—is required. If the use of 
affiliates—exempt or for-profit—is held to be an insufficient alternate 
channel, then any limitation—related or unrelated—on lobbying or 
political activity is jeopardized.  
This raises yet another major challenge to the tax exemption 
system potentially presented by Citizens United: the extent to which 
any limitations on speech are permitted in connection with the tax 
exemption of any exempt organization. This is because the entire 
classification of an organization as exempt is to a certain extent based 
upon the power of Congress to delineate a purpose and promote or 
classify it exclusive to other things. If Congress does not have the 
power to limit speech in relation to a tax classification, then the 
constitutionality of many other tax classifications also are likely to 
come into question. 
In any event, even if the Court decided that a sufficient alternate 
channel was constitutionally necessary, that the currently available 
channels are insufficient, and as a result, held that the Political 
                                                                                                                 
268 This presents an interesting issue with respect to the lobbying limitation, which may 
turn out to be more restrictive from a speech perspective than the Political Activities 
Prohibition. This is because there is no outlet for unlimited, unrelated lobbying activity by an 
exempt organization. By contrast, there potentially is such an outlet for political activity through 
use of a section 527 political organization. The political organization option is not available for 
unlimited lobbying, however, because lobbying is not considered an exempt purpose under 
section 527. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (2006) (defining “exempt function” as “the function of 
influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any 
individual to any Federal, State, or local public office . . . or the election of Presidential or Vice-
Presidential electors”). 
269 As discussed in Part IV, infra, however, the related-unrelated distinction itself is 
problematic in the political activity context. 
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Activities Prohibition is unconstitutional, not much need change. 
Section 501(c)(3) would be rewritten to omit the prohibition, but 
conditioning a charitable deduction on a recipient’s abstention from 
political activity would not necessarily be affected.
270
  
And this leads to another seemingly unremarked aspect of the 
alternate channel analysis: it only affects exemption. It says nothing 
about deductions. Indeed, implicit in Justice Blackmun’s approval of 
the section 501(c)(4) alternate channel is affirmation of Cammarano 
as applied to section 170 of the Code.
271
 To see this, note that Justice 
Blackmun’s alternate channel only preserves tax-exemption for the 
organization (through use of an affiliate). Lost, however, is the ability 
to receive tax deductible contributions, at least with respect to the 
organization’s lobbying activity.272 In other words, the alternate 
channel results in a loss of an indirect tax benefit; yet this was not of 
concern to Justice Blackmun or to the Court—the challenge, and their 
focus, was on the exemption condition. 
Shifting then to deductions and section 170 of the Code, the need 
for an alternate channel for the organization’s speech does not factor 
into whether the political activity and lobbying limitations of section 
170 are constitutional. This is because denying an individual or 
entity’s deduction for a contribution to an organization that engages 
in political or lobbying activity has only an indirect effect on the 
speech, at best. Such a rule does not affect the speech of the 
individual or entity as such. It does not even affect the ability of 
individuals to associate and speak collectively (which they remain 
free to do). Rather, as the Court has said, such a rule merely reflects 
Congress’s decision not to subsidize the speech.273 In this regard, it is 
                                                                                                                 
270 As currently written, a charitable contribution does not exist for contributions to an 
organization that is “disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of 
attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in . . . any 
political campaign . . . .” I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). Accordingly, if the Political Activities 
Prohibition of section 501(c)(3) were held unconstitutional, section 170(c)(2)(D) on its face 
would be to no effect as a technical matter. But even if courts did not read into section 170 a no 
political activity requirement, section 170 could easily be redrafted to deny a charitable 
deduction for contributions to organizations that engage in political activity or substantial 
lobbying. 
271 Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 553 (1983) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (“A § 501(c)(3) organization's right to speak is not infringed, because it is free to 
make known its views on legislation through its § 501(c)(4) affiliate without losing tax benefits 
for its nonlobbying activities.”). 
272 See id. (“The § 501(c)(4) affiliate would not be eligible to receive tax-deductible 
contributions.”). 
273 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (finding that Congress’s refusal 
to allow deductions for political activity “express[es] a determination . . . that since purchased 
publicity can influence the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the 
community, everyone in the community should stand on the same footing as regards its 
purchase so far as the Treasury of the United States is concerned”). 
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noteworthy that the speech at issue in Cammarano involved the most 
sympathetic type of lobbying expense—self-defense lobbying.274 Yet 
the Court had no sympathy.
275
  
Further, the penalty effect does not appear to be an issue for the 
charitable contribution deduction under section 170. If a taxpayer 
makes a contribution to a charity that impermissibly lobbies or 
engages in political activity, the taxpayer’s ability to take a charitable 
contribution deduction as a general matter is not affected. Thus, the 
taxpayer is not penalized in the broad sense that concerned Justice 
Douglas.  
In short, although it may be that the section 170 limitations were 
enacted as a backstop to the section 501(c)(3) limits,
276
 they 
nonetheless would require a distinct constitutional challenge to 
invalidate.
277
 Without such a successful challenge to the section 170 
limitations, removal of the section 501(c)(3) limits may not change 
much, at least with respect to organizations that want to be eligible to 
receive tax deductible contributions.
278
 Such organizations would 
continue to abide by the prohibition. 
C. Implications of Reliance on Constitutional Conditions Analysis. 
So far, the analysis has not directly discussed the doctrine of 
constitutional conditions, lamented by commentators for its 
incoherence.
279
 Under this doctrine, a condition made in connection 
                                                                                                                 
274 Petitioners were owners of wholesale alcohol businesses. One was lobbying against a 
bill in the State of Washington that would give the state complete control over wholesale 
alcohol sales. The other was lobbying against a statewide prohibition bill in Arkansas. Id. at 
500–02. 
275 See id. at 513 (affirming the lower court’s ruling against both petitioners). 
276 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
277 A similar analysis also should be made with respect to eligibility to receive tax-exempt 
bond financing under section 145 of the Code. Like the charitable deduction, the tax benefit is 
not provided directly to the section 501(c)(3) organization. Rather, the purchaser of the bonds 
receives the benefit of tax-exempt interest. I.R.C. § 145 (2006). For section 501(c)(3) 
organizations that rely on the availability of tax-exempt financing, such as charitable hospitals, a 
Political Activities Prohibition could be made a condition on receipt of such financing 
irrespective of whether such a prohibition is retained as a condition of tax exemption. In other 
words, for purposes of the Political Activities Prohibition, each of the tax benefits currently 
associated with tax-exempt status should be analyzed distinctly. For an argument that the tax 
benefits currently associated with section 501(c)(3) status should be disaggregated, see 
Colinvaux, supra note 100, at 64. 
278 Professors Crimm and Winer advocate removal of the Political Activities Prohibition as 
an exemption condition but retaining it for charitable deduction purposes. They note that this 
might not have a significant impact on houses of worship, many of which rely on contributions 
from individuals who do not itemize deductions and so who do not claim a deduction in any 
event. See CRIMM & WINER, supra note 27, at 327. Crimm and Winer also note that the impact 
on other section 501(c)(3) organizations is “less clear.” Id.  
279 The confusion surrounding the constitutional conditions doctrine stems from the 
inscrutable framework for decision and inconsistent application by the courts. See e.g., Richard 
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with providing a government benefit may be unconstitutional even if 
the government is under no obligation to provide the benefit.
280
 The 
central concern is that if the government is prohibited from directly 
limiting a person’s rights, then the government should not be able to 
so limit a person’s rights through the imposition of a condition in 
connection with a benefit. Speiser, Cammarano, and TWR are often 
cited as “constitutional conditions” cases.281 Importantly, TWR, and 
its alternate channel analysis have been cited approvingly in other 
constitutional conditions cases, such as Rust v. Sullivan
282
 and FCC v. 
League of Women Voters of California.
283
 Accordingly, the Court’s 
analysis of alternate channels in Rust and League of Women Voters
284
 
is commonly cited in scholarship in connection with the Political 
Activities Prohibition because of their relevance to the alternate 
channel analysis.
285
 
However, the cases have been grouped together by courts not only 
because of alternate channel but also because each case involves the 
                                                                                                                 
 
Epstein, Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1413 (1989). 
280 As outlined by Professor Chisolm, a government decision not to subsidize speech is, 
everyone agrees, fine. But if the government provides a benefit, and the grant or denial of the 
benefit is based on viewpoint or the content of speech or on suspect classifications, then the 
condition is reviewed subject to strict scrutiny and a compelling state interest is required. 
However, if the grant or denial of the benefit is just “a simple policy of nonsubsidy,” then only 
rational basis review is required. Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 27. TWR equated tax 
exemption with a subsidy, said that Congress had merely decided not to subsidize lobbying, and 
then appears to have applied a rational basis review. In the context of political activities, 
Professor Chisolm, writing however before the Branch Ministries decision, argued that the 
penalty effect mooted by Justice Douglas in Cammarano, should trigger a heightened scrutiny 
because of the absence of a sufficient alternate channel for political activities. 
281 In Speiser, the Court held that the loyalty oath was an unconstitutional condition for the 
reasons stated supra. In Cammarano and TWR, the Court held that the conditions were 
constitutional. 
282 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
283 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984). Here, the Court struck down a federal law that provided 
funding to noncommercial television and radio stations on the condition that such stations not 
engage in editorializing. Central to the Court’s reasoning was that the law did not allow for the 
editorializing activity even through a separate affiliate. The Court cited the TWR alternate 
channel approvingly, stating that if the stations were permitted to “establish ‘affiliate’ 
organizations which could then use the station’s facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds, 
such a statutory mechanism would plainly be valid”. 
284 Both cases stand for the general proposition that an alternate channel is relevant, and so 
both offer some support for the political activities prohibition to the extent that its alternate 
channel is sufficient. On the one hand, Rust could be distinguished because the alternate channel 
in Rust arguably is “better” than that provided by the tax rules because in Rust no separate 
organization was required; rather, the separation could occur within the existing organization. 
On the other hand, League of Women Voters provides support for the separate affiliation option. 
285 Galston, supra note 181; Leff, supra note 250; Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 27. 
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provision of a government benefit.
286
 In Rust and League of Women 
Voters, the benefits are direct public funding.
287
 In TWR, the benefits 
cited are the subsidy-like exemptions and deductions.
288
 Importantly, 
under a constitutional conditions analysis, from the provision of a 
“benefit” comes a facilitation of government conditions that may 
directly affect fundamental rights. Thus, in Rust, the Court upheld a 
condition on the funding of family planning services under Title X of 
the Public Health Service Act, namely that no abortion counseling be 
provided with the federal funds.
289
 The Court noted that the funding 
scheme distinguished between a project “grantee” and the funded 
project of the grantee (a “Title X Project”), and that grantee as grantee 
remained free to provide such counseling, just not in connection with 
the separately established, federally funded project.
290
 Thus, the 
abortion-related condition did not burden the grantee’s First 
Amendment rights to speak.
291
 
This sort of micromanaging may be permissible in the context of 
direct public funding. The question is the extent to which it is 
permitted in the context of government benefits to charitable 
organizations. Reliance on Rust to uphold the Political Activities 
Prohibition could run the risk of turning the “independent” sector into 
a series of “Project Xs,” subject to explicit direction by the federal 
government. In other words, if Rust applies conceptually, then the 
door may be open to conditioning any number of restraints on 
charitable organizations without constitutional impediment.  
                                                                                                                 
286 The Court called Rust v. Sullivan “a case of the Government refusing to fund activities, 
including speech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded.” 500 
U.S. at 194–195. The Rust Court cited a case in which the Court upheld a state’s decision to 
subsidize childbirth services but not abortion, providing that the government may “‘make a 
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the 
allocation of public funds.’” Id. at 192–193 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). 
The Court then cited TWR for the proposition that the “legislature’s decision not to subsidize the 
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.” Id. at 193 (quoting Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
287 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203 (prohibiting recipients of family planning funds under Title X 
from engaging in abortion counseling); League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 402 
(finding a ban on editorializing by an educational broadcasting station that received direct public 
funding violated the First Amendment). 
288 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (noting that 
“appropriations are comparable to tax exemptions and deductions”). 
289 500 U.S. at 203. 
290 Id. at 196 (noting that preventing an organization that receives funding under Title X 
from counseling about abortion “do[es] not force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related 
speech; [it] merely require[s] that the grantee keep such activities separate and distinct from 
Title X activities”). 
291 Id. at 203. 
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This risk is present because TWR characterizes tax exemption as a 
subsidy—thus inviting a constitutional conditions analysis.292 But the 
subsidy characterization is not necessarily accurate. Whether section 
501(c)(3) provides a subsidy may depend upon the rationale for 
charitable tax exemption.
293
 To the extent that section 501(c)(3) is 
designed to provide a cash grant to the organization in the amount of 
income tax the organization would otherwise owe, per TWR, then 
perhaps there is a subsidy.  
But this question has been debated since the outset of the 
exemption in 1913. If charitable exemption is recognition of a co-
sovereign, then exemption makes sense but not as a “subsidy.”294 If 
charitable exemption is to lessen the burdens of government,
295
 then it 
is less of a subsidy than a division of labor. If charitable exemption 
reflects a normative principle that “good” organizations simply 
should not be taxed, perhaps exemption is not a subsidy in the 
traditional sense of the term. Rather, the exemption just recognizes 
that charitable organizations should, as a matter of tax policy, be 
taxed differently from for-profit organizations. Further, even if there 
is a subsidy conceptually, for many if not most charitable 
organizations, tax-exempt status does not provide much if any actual 
tax savings. And it would therefore be ironic to base the 
constitutionality of onerous conditions on the provision of a subsidy 
that is actually of little monetary value. Here again, however, section 
501(c)(3) and section 170 are distinct. Although some have argued 
that section 170 is not a subsidy,
296
 the more common approach is the 
                                                                                                                 
292 See TWR, 461 U.S. at 544 (“Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of 
subsidy that is administered through the tax system.”). 
293 See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX 
L. REV. 283, 283–84 (2011) (discussing “whether the income tax exemption for charities is 
consistent with normal income tax principles or is a departure that must be justified as a 
subsidy”). 
294 See Brody, supra note 126, at 592 (footnote omitted) (“While most observers have 
described tax exemption as a subsidy, a zero rate of tax differs qualitatively, not just 
quantitatively, from a one-percent rate of tax.”). 
295 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 75–1860, at 19 (1938) (“The exemption from taxation of 
money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the 
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which 
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits 
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.”). 
296 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 309, 313 (1972) (discussing the charitable tax deduction in terms of a consumption tax). 
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subsidy view.
297
 Indeed, unlike tax exemption, the charitable 
deduction has long been considered a “tax expenditure.”298 
The discussion above has several implications. Notwithstanding 
TWR, the constitutional conditions doctrine’s applicability to 
charitable tax exemption because it is a government-provided subsidy 
is not self-evident. At a minimum, assuming that the government is 
providing a “benefit,” it is important to maintain distinctions between 
the benefit of tax exemption and the benefit of direct subsidies such 
as those provided in Rust and League of Women Voters. Although the 
cases commonly are grouped together, the difference with respect to 
the benefits provided suggests that as a general matter a different 
analysis of the condition should apply.  
But if the constitutional conditions doctrine applies with less force 
to tax-exemption, or arguably does not apply at all, what is the effect 
on the analysis of the constitutionality of the Political Activities 
Prohibition? On the one hand, if exemption is not a benefit, this 
undermines the argument made in Part II.E that the Rule is not 
identity based speech because it makes section 501(c)(3) status less 
like a tax classification (i.e., an invention of the tax code) and more 
like a core entity type, akin to a corporation. Thus, following the 
reasoning of Citizens United, the Political Activities Prohibition is 
more like a ban on corporate speech than was argued earlier. On the 
other hand, even if charitable tax exemption is not a government 
“benefit,” it can still be upheld for all the reasons stated previously—
the Rule’s purpose is not to suppress speech and Congress has a 
sufficient interest in having a nonpartisan charitable sector. Perhaps 
most importantly, however, the question of whether section 501(c)(3) 
provides a “benefit” highlights again the distinction between sections 
501(c)(3) and 170. So even if the question casts additional doubt on 
the constitutionality of the Political Activities Prohibition for 
exemption purposes, it says nothing about the constitutionality of the 
prohibition for deduction purposes. And, to a certain extent, it is 
really section 170 that is the more important of the two.
299
 Congress 
                                                                                                                 
297 See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role 
of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 517 (2010) (discussing the subsidy theory and 
noting that it is the more “common” view); Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 27, at 274–75 
(discussing the various subsidy theories of federal taxation). 
298 The five-year (2008–2012) tax expenditure for the charitable tax deduction is estimated 
to be $264 billion. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008–2012, at 53, 55–56 (Comm. Print 2008) (combining 
$35.9 billion for education, $204.9 billion for social services, and $23.2 billion for health). 
299 Again, it is important to keep in mind the several benefits associated with section 
501(c)(3) status, and the varying importance of one or the other to a particular organization. For 
some organizations, exemption might be of great significance. For others, it might be the 
deduction. For still others, it might be the ability to benefit from tax-exempt financing. To 
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has a stronger spending purpose and the tax benefit arguably is more 
significant to the charities (even though less direct). 
D. Summary 
In brief, this Part has argued that even if the Court was persuaded 
that the purpose of the Political Activities Prohibition was to suppress 
speech or that the prohibition had a penalty effect, and therefore 
concluded that the prohibition was unconstitutional, present law 
would not change significantly. The disallowance of the charitable 
deduction for contributions to organizations that engage in political 
activity requires a distinct constitutional challenge, which it should 
easily survive. In addition, the charitable sector should be mindful of 
the perils of relying on a constitutional conditions analysis in support 
of the Political Activities Prohibition. That analysis could open the 
door to increased government involvement in the affairs of charitable 
organizations. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE STATUS QUO ARE WANTING 
So far, the analysis has focused largely on whether the Political 
Activities Prohibition is constitutional as such without much 
comment on alternatives. What if, notwithstanding the arguments 
made in Part II of this Article, the Court concluded that the 
prohibition was an unconstitutional burden on speech? What would 
this mean? Such a conclusion would raise a number of difficult 
questions. Must the law allow unlimited political activity by 
charities? May a political purpose be a charitable purpose? Are 
political activities to be considered as an acceptable means to a 
(nonpolitical) charitable end? Are limits to the political activity of 
charities permissible, and if so, what kind of limits? These are key 
questions that should inform not only the constitutional analysis, but 
also, assuming the constitutionality of the Political Activities 
Prohibition, whether Congress should, on its own initiative, modify it. 
A. One Extreme: Congress May Not Restrict the Political Activity of 
Charitable Organizations 
At first blush, it might be assumed that if the Political Activities 
Prohibition is unconstitutional, then no limit or restraint upon the 
                                                                                                                 
 
undertake a detailed analysis of each is beyond the scope of this Article. The point here is to 
highlight that answering the question of the prohibition with respect to one benefit—that of 
exemption—does not answer the question with respect to other benefits. 
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political activities of charities is allowed. Such a conclusion certainly 
would be the easiest to administer and enforce, as there would be 
nothing to administer or enforce. The line between political and 
nonpolitical activity, between education and propaganda, would not 
have to be drawn. There would be no facts and circumstances to 
consider.  
Such a conclusion also would best facilitate core First Amendment 
speech. Facing no restraint, charities could speak and spend on 
political activity as much as desired. To the extent that protecting 
speech is the critical concern, discarding the prohibition and replacing 
it with unfettered speech seems an easy and intuitively attractive 
solution.
300
 But this overlooks a critical point, namely that unless 
there is some limit on the political activity of section 501(c)(3) 
organizations, the charitable purpose requirement
301
 would lose much 
of its meaning. Currently, it is because of the Political Activities 
Prohibition that a section 501(c)(3) organization as such stands apart, 
or operates distinctly, from its actual or contemplated political 
activity. That is, because a section 501(c)(3) organization is 
prohibited from participating in politics, by definition there must be a 
meaningful “charity” in existence apart from any political activity. It 
is from this vantage point that we often think of the merits of the 
Political Activities Prohibition: i.e., whether a charity, viewed 
separately from any political activity, may or should be able to 
engage in politics. 
But, without the Political Activities Prohibition or any limit on 
political activities, this vital distinction would erode. There would be 
nothing to prevent an organization formed to “help feed the poor” 
from doing nothing other than campaign intervention.  
Because the charitable purpose requirement has no substantive or 
positive content
302—it is after all a purpose requirement—an 
organization with the purpose of helping to feed the poor should 
qualify under the organizational and operational test even if all its 
activities were political. Clearly, the organizational test would be no 
barrier, as helping to feed the poor is a charitable purpose.
303
 The 
                                                                                                                 
300 If such an approach were adopted, it would call into question limitations on the political 
activities of other exempt organizations and the constitutionality of the tax under section 
527(f)(1), which provides that an exempt organization, which is not a political organization, 
must include certain amounts in gross income. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2006).  
301 Again, “charitable” here includes all the section 501(c)(3) exempt purposes: charitable, 
educational, religious, scientific, etc. I.R.C. § 503(c). 
302 See Colinvaux, supra note 100, at 14–15 (discussing the absence of positive 
requirements for charitable status). 
303 The organizational test requires that the organization be organized exclusively for 
exempt purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b) (as amended in 2008). Typically it may be 
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operational test too would be satisfied. Here, the regulations say that 
to be operated exclusively for exempt purposes, the primary purpose 
of the organization must be an exempt purpose. This primary purpose 
test is met “if [the organization] engages primarily in activities which 
accomplish” the exempt purpose.304 Under this formulation, activities 
themselves are not necessarily either charitable or uncharitable, but 
are viewed in connection with the ends served. Accordingly, an 
organization that favored candidates who want to help “feed the poor” 
would be engaged in an activity to accomplish exempt purposes.  
In short, without any restriction on political activities, it is not 
clear whether anything would prevent a purely political organization 
from qualifying as a section 501(c)(3) organization. The term “PAC” 
would have to be modified to include not only “political action 
committee” but also “political action charity.” In addition to all the 
other types of present law charities (hospital, college or university, 
church, scientific organization, etc.) a charity could also be an action 
organization,
305
 or what we think of today as a political organization. 
B. Assuming Change to the Prohibition, Some Limit Should Be 
Contemplated 
If equating a political organization and a charity is unpalatable, 
one might want to consider various limitations. One approach, based 
on the current way of thinking about charity, might be to allow 
political activities but only for “real” charities, that is, charities that 
have some quantum of charitable activity that is not political activity. 
As a general matter, however, this would not work because our 
system provides exemption based on purposes not activities.
306
 If the 
purpose is legitimate and the activities plausibly are undertaken to 
advance the purpose, the discussion ends. There is no inquiry into 
whether an activity is charitable as such.
307
  
                                                                                                                 
 
satisfied through a statement in the organization’s governing instrument. Id. In general, “feeding 
the poor” would qualify as a charitable purpose under the Treasury regulations. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (defining charitable to include “[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the 
underprivileged”). 
304 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1). 
305 Note that because of the Political Activities Prohibition, the Treasury Regulations 
provide that a section 501(c)(3) organization may not be an action organization. Treas. Reg. § 
1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(i). An action organization includes an organization that engages in political 
activity. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(ii). 
306 Hopkins, supra note 25, at 72 (“The primary purpose test looks . . . to an organization’s 
purpose rather than its activities.”). 
307 Activities are, however, relevant. See infra Part IV.C. If activities serve a non-charitable 
purpose, a substantial level of such activities may indicate that a primary purpose of the 
organization is not charitable, and therefore the organization ceases to qualify under section 
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Nevertheless, one might require as an affirmative obligation of 
section 501(c)(3) status that an organization may not qualify unless it 
conducts some level of activity that serves an exempt purpose and 
that is not political activity. The obvious and difficult questions would 
be how much nonpolitical activity is required and how it would be 
measured. And any such requirement, though styled as an affirmative 
obligation to conduct nonpolitical activity, would in effect be a limit 
on the amount of political activity because inevitably, the requisite 
amount of “good” activity would be defined in relation to the political 
activity.
308
 
Alternatively, one could attempt to draw a different line and say 
that charitable exemption should be denied to organizations that are 
really political organizations in disguise. Such an approach would be 
to assert that there is a relevant distinction between exempt purposes 
and political purposes, and that charitable exemption should be 
granted only for “exempt” nonpolitical purposes. The analysis here 
would not be on the political activities as such, but whether the 
activities “truly” further an exempt purpose, or instead a political 
purpose. This could be similar to the present law commerciality 
doctrine, which denies charitable exemption if the activities of an 
organization take on too much of a commercial hue, i.e., the 
organization seems more like a for profit business than a charity.
309
  
But, as in the commerciality context, the line distinguishing a 
political purpose from an exempt purpose would likely be very 
difficult to draw, especially in an area protected by the First 
Amendment. For example, an organization could state its purpose as 
finding ways to help the poor. If the organization promotes the 
                                                                                                                 
 
501(c)(3). See Better Bus. Bureau of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) 
(stating that, for an educational non-profit organization, “the presence of a single 
noneducational purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the 
number or importance of truly educational purposes”). 
308 For example, in order for such an affirmative requirement to have substance, the 
nonpolitical activity must be substantial, otherwise a token amount would do. See I.R.C. § 
501(c)(3) (2006) (“no substantial part” of the activities of a 501(c)(3) organization may attempt 
“to influence legislation [or] . . . participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on 
behalf of . . . any candidate for public office”). But substantiality likely would have meaning 
only in relation to the amount of political activity. An organization with little-to-no political 
activity would not have to undertake much nonpolitical activity to qualify. But an organization 
with considerable political activity would have a higher nonpolitical activity threshold. This in 
turn would encourage the organization to reduce the amount of political activity so as to 
strengthen the substantiality of the nonpolitical activity. Assuming that the Supreme Court holds 
the Political Activities Prohibition unconstitutional, all this raises the question of what sorts of 
limits would be constitutionally acceptable and the rationale. 
309 See generally John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487 (2002) (analyzing the rules that dictate amount of commercial 
activity that a charity is allowed to engage in while retaining the charitable exemption). 
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candidates it believes (or says it believes) are committed to that goal, 
a principled challenge to the organization as “politically motivated” 
would be very hard to establish (even if it were clear what being 
politically motivated means).  
Another limit might be to suggest that although political activity 
should be permitted, it should be limited in extent. That is, if it is too 
difficult to question an organization’s true purpose as political or not, 
the quantum of activities of the organization could be used as a proxy 
for the organization’s purposes. Thus, an organization with a lot of 
political activity could be suspect because, one might argue, the more 
political activity there is, the more likely the organization is really a 
political organization and not a charity.
310
  
But even if we knew how much political activity generally should 
be equated with political purposes (10 percent? 50 percent?), there 
appears to be no reason to assume that the amount of political activity 
as such would have any meaningful bearing on an organization’s 
“true” purpose.311 One could answer that it does not matter, we just 
need to limit the amount of political activity as a prophylactic against 
                                                                                                                 
310 An activity-based limit would likely take one of two forms: something similar to the 
current “no substantial part” rule that applies in the lobbying context, I.R.C. § 501(h) (2006), or 
something like the rule in the section 501(c)(4) context, namely that the political activities may 
not become so extensive as to become a primary purpose of the organization, Treas. Reg. § 
1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990); Rev. Rul. 81–95, 1981–1 C.B. 332 (“Thus, an 
organization may carry on lawful political activities and remain exempt under section 501(c)(4) 
as long as it is primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare.”). A “no substantial 
part” rule seems especially problematic, assuming that the Political Activities Prohibition is 
unconstitutional. If it is unconstitutional to bar political activities altogether because the speech 
is so fundamental, it may not make much sense to say that political activities are constitutional 
so long as the organization stops speaking after the first paragraph. And irrespective of the 
constitutional question, a “no substantial part” approach would arguably be worse than the 
current rule. For example, at least the current rule provides clarity on the question of how much 
activity is permitted—zero. But a no substantial part rule would introduce new uncertainty on 
the amount of permitted activity and new complexity. If a regime similar to that of section 
501(h) were adopted, for example, it would be unlikely to satisfy organizations making mission-
based arguments for allowing political activity, and all the benefits of the current rule (a 
nonpartisan sector) would be lost, with little apparent gain. The section 501(c)(4) approach 
would provide a more generous limit on political activities (capped so as to prevent a political 
purpose from becoming a primary purpose) but also raises similar questions. See infra Part IV.C 
for a more detailed discussion of these questions.  
311 Indeed, many organizations, especially organizations that believe political activity is 
required by the organization’s mission, would argue that political activity that is related to the 
mission clearly serves an exempt purpose and so should not be subject to an arbitrary limit that 
does not take the relatedness of the speech into account. See Elizabeth Kingsley & John 
Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation 
of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 90–91 
(2004) (offering an example of the issues associated with a nonprofit organization attempting to 
advance its purpose through political methods). If it could be established that an organization’s 
political activity served a private end and not a charitable one, then it is a different question. But 
no special rule would be needed for such a case because the private benefit doctrine already 
should prohibit exemption. 
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the political organization masquerading as charity. But then we have 
not advanced very far from the Political Activities Prohibition in the 
first place, which, among other things, is such a prophylactic.
312
 
Furthermore, if it is unconstitutional to prohibit political activities, 
why is it constitutional to allow just a little bit of such activities? This 
too seems to be a difficult question to answer. 
Yet another approach could be to treat political activity much like 
any other, and subject it to a related-unrelated test.
313
 Activities are 
neither inherently charitable nor noncharitable—their character 
depends upon relatedness to an exempt purpose.
314
 Assuming that a 
political purpose is not an exempt purpose, then, under this approach, 
political activity must be examined to see whether it is related to an 
exempt purpose. If it is related, then the activity is unrestricted. If it is 
unrelated, then the activity is permitted, but may not become so 
substantial that the purpose served becomes a primary purpose. If this 
happens, then the charitable exemption is lost.
315
 
The difficulties with this approach are similar to those discussed 
previously in this Part regarding other possible limitations. First, 
drawing a related-unrelated distinction would be extremely difficult. 
Except in egregious cases, an organization, including a charity PAC, 
should be able to trace political activity to some exempt purpose. 
Second, adopting the related-unrelated paradigm involves limiting 
political activities—namely, unrelated political activity may not 
become substantial. To the extent the First Amendment is concerned 
with protecting speech as speech, it would seem not to matter much 
whether the speech is “related” to an organization’s exempt purpose. 
Rather the question is whether it is burdened.  
In addition, although a related-unrelated distinction may have 
intuitive appeal because it is familiar, it may not make sense in the 
speech context. Viewed under the First Amendment, we are talking 
about the speech of a section 501(c)(3) organization as a section 
501(c)(3) organization (a value the Court presumably would be 
protecting if it struck down the Political Activities Prohibition). Does 
                                                                                                                 
312 See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text (describing the prophylactic purpose of 
the rule). 
313 See supra notes 269–273 and accompanying text (discussing the related-unrelated 
distinction made by section 501(c)(4)); see also Rev. Rul. 81–95, 1981–1 C.B. 332 (finding that 
an organization’s primary purpose must be related to promoting social welfare). 
314 See supra notes 269–273 and accompanying text (discussing the related-unrelated 
distinction made by section 501(c)(4)). 
315 See Better Bus. Bureau of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (stating 
that, for an educational non-profit organization, “the presence of a single noneducational 
purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or 
importance of truly educational purposes”). 
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it make sense to say that a charity speaking as a charity is somehow 
speaking in a way that is unrelated to itself? It would seem that the 
presumption must be that organizational speech is in the best interest 
of the organization, or at least is of the organization and so somehow 
related to its (primary) purposes. If the charity speaks as the agent for 
another, then there likely are private benefit problems, which are 
covered by the private benefit doctrine.
316
 But a charity speaking as a 
“person,” expressing views on its own behalf, is not speaking in a 
related or unrelated fashion. Whatever the content—it is just speech, 
and by definition the speech of a charity, which would seem to take 
on an inherently “related” character. In short, a limit based on a 
related-unrelated distinction would likely be no limit at all. 
C. Taxing Speech: The Most Plausible Limitation  
It is because of the futility of the above limitations that one might 
resort to regulating the political speech of charities through the Code. 
Namely, if it is unconstitutional to prohibit charities from engaging in 
political activity, and no reasonable line can be drawn, then what 
remains is to allow political activity by charities, but tax it. Such a 
solution would really be a continuation of current law, but instead of 
revocation of section 501(c)(3) status for engaging in political 
activity, the sanction would be to tax the organization with respect to 
the political activity.  
This solution ties into perhaps the most forceful objection to the 
Political Activities Prohibition—namely, the nature of the penalty for 
violation. As noted above, the argument is that revocation of section 
501(c)(3) status is a penalty disproportionate to the offense.
317
 Thus, a 
narrower approach would be to provide for a tax based on the extent 
of political activity, and therefore allow a charity to retain section 
501(c)(3) status. This approach has some appeal because it does not 
undermine the power of Congress to decide whether or not to 
subsidize speech. Rather, it merely says that the penalty of revocation 
of section 501(c)(3) status is an overbroad remedy.  
Using the existing legal regime, the result generally would be to 
treat expenses for political activity by section 501(c)(3) organizations 
just like those of other tax-exempt organizations. A charity could 
either make its political activity expenses
318
 from a separate 
                                                                                                                 
316 See supra note 95 (defining the private benefit doctrine). 
317 See supra Part III.B. 
318 Congress would have to fashion a definition of “political activity expenses.” Under 
present law, there are multiple terms at play. A “political expenditure” is a defined term for 
section 501(c)(3) organizations and generally means expenses in violation of the Political 
Activities Prohibition. I.R.C. § 4955(d)(1) (2006). Such expenses are subject to an excise tax. 
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segregated fund (or PAC)
319
 or forgo the PAC option, make the 
expenses directly, and be subject to tax on the expenses under section 
527(f)(1).
320
 Under that approach, the independent expenditures of 
charities, for example, generally would be subject to tax.
321
  
There are some pitfalls. Perhaps most importantly, the political 
activities of charities that did not have expenditures directly 
associated with the activity (such as endorsements, which may require 
little-to-no direct expenditure) generally would not be captured. This 
is important not only because such activities can be the most potent, 
but also because failure to capture them undermines the rationale for 
the taxing speech approach: although Congress may refuse to promote 
political activity, it just must not over-punish. Accordingly, fully 
capturing the value associated with all political activities is critical. 
But, even if complex special rules could be developed rationally to 
attribute some expenditure to each instance of political activity,
322
 a 
missing link is that tax-exemption as such supports the entire section 
501(c)(3) organization. Presumably, the reason for allowing a section 
501(c)(3) organization to speak politically without using an 
alternative structure would be that section 501(c)(3) provides a 
distinct and valuable voice. But the value of that voice is to a certain 
extent directly supported by the blanket section 501(c)(3) exemption, 
                                                                                                                 
 
I.R.C. § 4955(a)–(b). Alternatively, tax-exempt organizations that are not section 501(c)(3) 
organizations and so not subject to an excise tax on their “political expenditures” are subject to 
tax on expenses for an “exempt function” as that term is defined in section 527. I.R.C. § 
527(e)(2). Confusingly, “exempt function” expenses are generally those made for political 
purposes, i.e., for the exempt function of a political organization governed by section 527. Id. 
319 Such a fund would be considered a political organization under section 527 and subject 
to those rules. I.R.C. § 527(f)(3). 
320 Section 527(f)(1) provides that a tax-exempt organization (other than a section 527 
political organization) is subject to tax on the amount of its political expenses or the amount of 
its investment income, whichever is less. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1). Thus, tax-exempt organizations 
foregoing the PAC option can avoid the section 527(f)(1) tax to the extent they have no 
investment income. Id.  
321 Current Treasury Regulations reserve the rules for taxation of expenditures allowed by 
FECA, which at the time of the reservation did not include independent expenditures, but, after 
Citizens United, does. Treas. Reg. § 1.527–6(b)(3) (1980); see also Aprill, supra note 18, at 392 
(explaining that “Citizens United is understood to mean that section 501(c)(4), section 
501(c)(5), and 501(c)(6) organizations may make independent expenditures”). Accordingly, the 
taxation of independent expenditures pursuant to section 527(f)(1) depends in part on the status 
of the reserved regulations. Id. (observing that “the regulations currently treat no expenditure 
permitted by the Federal Election Campaign Act as being for an exempt function subject to the 
section 527(f) tax” because a paragraph that 527(f) refers to, section 527(b)(3), is currently 
reserved). 
322 See Leff, supra note 250, at 715–23 (developing a regime for, among other things, 
determining how to allocate expenses to non-expenditure activities, such as endorsements). See 
also American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 692(b) (as introduced in 
the House, June 4, 2004) (treating a set percentage of income as subject to tax for violations of 
the Political Activities Prohibition). 
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i.e., it cannot realistically be allocated out. Accordingly, special rules 
or not, it may be impracticable to tailor a more appropriate penalty 
than the current one: loss of exempt status. 
In addition, another potential pitfall with the taxing speech 
approach is whether it would raise new concerns about penalizing 
speech. Although more narrowly tailored than the current rule, it 
would be a tax on speech, which could have a chilling effect. Thus, 
for example, although a charity might no longer face loss of section 
501(c)(3) status, each independent expenditure may have tax 
consequences, which to an organization with a baseline of tax-
exemption would still seem like a penalty.
323
  
The taxing speech approach would also be an exception to the 
generally prevailing rule that charitable organizations may not engage 
in unlimited unrelated activity.
324
 Because the political activity was 
subject to tax, it would follow that it was not a “related” activity, even 
if such terminology were not used. Due to constitutional concerns, 
however, unlike other unrelated activities, the charity could engage in 
as much of it as desired, so long as taxes are paid.
325
 This runs counter 
to the very idea that a charitable organization should be organized and 
operated exclusively for charitable purposes. Further, as a practical 
matter, this approach does not avoid vagueness or line-drawing 
problems because it would still be necessary to distinguish between 
taxable speech and nontaxable speech.
326
 
                                                                                                                 
323 Because of Citizens United, this is now an issue for noncharitable exempt organizations 
such as section 501(c)(4) organizations, which, after Citizens United, are subject to the section 
527(f)(1) tax for independent expenditures. Aprill, supra note 18, at 392. Detailed discussion of 
this issue is, however, outside the scope of this Article. See id. at 391–401 (discussing the effect 
of Citizens United on noncharitable tax-exempt organizations). Additionally, if the baseline is 
more appropriately that of a taxable organization, then taxation of speech is not necessarily a 
penalty but just partial withdrawal of a benefit. Assuming that the proper baseline is that of a 
taxable organization, revocation of section 501(c)(3) status altogether, which is the current rule, 
is really just a difference of degree not of kind. Blanket revocation can and, as argued above, 
should be construed as total revocation of a benefit, and not as a penalty with constitutional 
dimensions. See supra Part II.C. 
324 See People’s Educ. Camp Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 331 F.2d 923, 935 (2d Cir. 1964) 
(ruling that “feeder” organizations that provide funds to exempt organizations are taxable, 
despite their purpose to provide funds to nontaxable organizations). 
325 Political activity would thus be treated better than unrelated business activity, which 
also is subject to tax, and may not be unlimited because the organization would lose its tax-
exempt status. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69–220, 1969–1 C.B. 154 (deciding that a club was not 
exempt from taxes because it was not organized exclusively for nonprofit purposes); I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 39,108 (May 28, 1982) (examining the significance of an organization’s source of 
income in determining tax exemption).  
326 Also affecting the analysis is whether the “subsidy” rationale for tax-exempt status is 
adopted. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of the subsidy rationale. If not, then a taxing 
speech approach should in theory be based on something other than tailoring the penalty to the 
activity subsidized. 
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D. Much Ado About Nothing? It Depends on the Deduction. 
Notwithstanding these objections, of the alternatives to the 
Political Activities Prohibition, a taxing speech approach probably is 
the best.
327
 It does not involve arbitrary limits on the amount of 
political activity and does not require related-unrelated distinctions. 
Organizations that argue that political intervention is connected to, if 
not required by, the organization’s mission likely would be satisfied, 
especially (and ironically) because it would be difficult to impose a 
loss of tax benefit with respect to endorsements or other types of 
speech where there is no obvious expenditure. Thus, the “true” 
charities, or those with substantial nonpolitical activities, that want to 
dabble in politics would be able to participate in a meaningful way in 
political campaigns.  
Further, for those concerned about charities becoming too 
immersed in politics, there would be real disincentives to political 
activity. Political activity expenses, such as independent expenditures, 
would likely have tax consequences. In addition, as discussed in Part 
I, although endorsements and other types of campaign intervention 
might not carry tax consequences, they would present their own 
perils: most pertinently, that of alienating the organization’s own 
constituency.
328
  
But even if all this were an acceptable solution, there remains 
another critical issue: the charitable deduction.
329
 If the present law 
approach to the charitable deduction is retained,
330
 which appears to 
present negligible constitutional concerns, the change to the 
exemption rules might be much ado about nothing. This is because 
charities that value the charitable deduction would refrain from 
engaging in political activity. Further, political organizations that 
might be tempted to become charity PACs (i.e., political 
organizations disguised as charities) would lose a reason to organize 
as a charity.
331
 Accordingly, unless the charitable deduction rules 
                                                                                                                 
327 This is not an endorsement of the approach, however. 
328 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
329 Other tax benefits, such as receipt of tax-exempt financing are also important to 
consider. See supra note 277. 
330 That approach contains no such deduction to organizations that engage in political 
activity, I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2006), and, as noted in Part III.B, presents little constitutional 
concerns. 
331 The allure of branding political speech under the section 501(c)(c) moniker might be 
significant, even without the charitable deduction. And there could still be other incentives, 
namely more favorable disclosure rules. Charities, other than private foundations, are not 
required to publicly disclose donors, as are political organizations. I.R.C. § 6104(d)(3). This 
highlights another change that would have to be debated, whether the disclosure rules for 
charities should be changed if political activity is allowed. This would become part of the 
ongoing debate about disclosure. See H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (as introduced in the House, June 
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were modified to allow charitable contributions to charities that 
engage in political activity, changes to the exemption rules might not 
achieve the goal.
332
 
One might respond then that the charitable deduction rules 
therefore should also be changed. And therein lies the rub. Here, there 
are two approaches. One is just to make a blanket change to the 
policy of the charitable deduction, and provide that a charitable 
deduction is available irrespective of the political activity of charities. 
But although Congress has the power to take such action, it is highly 
doubtful that it would. The revenue consequences likely would be 
significant. Arguably, such a change would result in a lot of new 
charitable contributions, especially as the change would encourage 
formation of new politically-oriented section 501(c)(3) organizations. 
Further, apart from revenue concerns, Congress might simply not opt 
for a policy that would encourage political activity by charities and 
further dilute the meaning of charitable purpose. In addition, there is a 
real risk of “charity capture.” Major donors might make large 
charitable contributions with political intent, and subject charities to 
their political preferences, thus driving the charity’s political activity.  
Another option would be to attempt to retain coherence between 
the charitable exemption and the charitable deduction, and follow 
through on the taxing speech approach in the charitable deduction 
context. This would continue the policy of nonsubsidy for political 
activity and discourage donors from making contributions for 
political purposes. Under such an approach, there would be some 
disallowance of the charitable deduction to the extent that an 
organization engages in political activity. Thus, a regime could be 
established to deny a portion of a charitable deduction to donors with 
respect to contributions made to organizations that engage in political 
activity, in proportion to such activity.
333
 Or, in the alternative, the 
deduction would be allowed but the organization would pay a proxy 
tax on the amount of subsidy provided by the charitable deduction.
334
 
                                                                                                                 
 
28, 2010) (proposing additional disclosure requirements with respect to spending in Federal 
elections). 
332 But section 501(c)(3) could be attractive for gift tax purposes because contributions to 
section 501(c)(3) organizations are exempt from the gift tax whereas contributions to other 
section 501(c) organizations do not have an explicit exemption. I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2). Whether, 
for example, gifts to section 501(c)(4) organizations are exempt from gift tax is a subject of 
considerable debate. See Aprill, supra note 18, at 384–385 (discussing the various positions that 
have been taken regarding the gift tax and gifts to section 501(c)(4) organizations). 
333 For example, if a donor made a contribution of $100 to a charity, 10 percent of the 
activities of which were political activity, the donor would be allowed a deduction of $90 
instead of the full $100. 
334 Such an approach would be similar to present-law rules that ensure that otherwise 
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The need for such a proxy tax regime, however, further magnifies the 
problem, discussed above, of valuing the subsidy (here, the amount of 
a charitable contribution that should be disallowed) for political 
activities that do not have readily assignable expenses, such as 
endorsements. To the extent such activities cannot be readily 
captured, deductible political donations for such political activity 
likely would be an enormous loophole. Thus, a serious risk of charity 
capture, and substantial revenue loss, would remain. 
E. Summary 
In short, alternatives to the status quo, whether constitutionally 
mandated or not, are unappealing. The alternatives range from the 
extreme of unlimited political activity to drawing arbitrary lines 
regarding the amount of permitted political activity. The former 
would undermine the meaning of charity, by inviting political 
purposes into the fold. The latter alternatives involve difficult line-
drawing exercises that offer little-to-no improvement over present law 
but without the benefits of the present Rule. Arguably, the best 
alternative is taxing political activity, which would address the 
putative “penalty effect” of the Political Activities Prohibition by 
tailoring the penalty to the political activity. But even that might have 
little practical impact absent corresponding changes to the charitable 
deduction. And those changes in turn would likely leave the gaping 
and undesirable loophole of politically motivated contributions and 
political capture of charities by major donors. 
CONCLUSION 
Citizens United makes a Supreme Court challenge to the Political 
Activities Prohibition likely and a reexamination of the political 
speech of charities necessary. This Article has argued that although 
the Political Activities Prohibition has flaws, it has largely been a 
noncontroversial rule that serves important purposes. Most critically, 
the prohibition draws an important line that acts as one of the few 
limitations on the charitable purpose requirement. Because of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
deductible membership dues paid by businesses to exempt organizations, such as trade 
associations that engage in nondeductible lobbying activity, either are not deducted or, if 
deducted, tax is paid to the extent of the value of the deduction. I.R.C. § 6033(e). It already has 
been proposed in Congress that the proxy tax regime be extended to the lobbying activities of 
section 501(c)(3) organizations in order to deny the charitable deduction with respect to a 
charity’s lobbying activity. MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG., 
INVESTIGATION OF JACK ABRAMOFF’S USE OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 54 (Comm. Print 
2006). 
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prohibition, charities are not allowed to get involved in politics, 
which gives the charitable purpose requirement clarity and keeps the 
“independent” sector independent.  
Although the risks of loosening the prohibition may be overstated, 
the gains from doing so are not apparent. There is real, if intangible, 
benefit to a charitable sector that is noble in purpose and free of 
partisan rancor. Further, there is no easy alternative to the Political 
Activities Prohibition. Accordingly, this Article has argued that the 
Political Activities Prohibition should be retained.  
Of course, retention of the Rule would not be possible if it were 
unconstitutional. Although Citizens United presents a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the prohibition, close analysis of the case results 
in several meaningful and critical distinctions that could and should 
lead to the conclusion that the Political Activities Prohibition is not, 
for constitutional purposes, a burden on speech. This is not to say that 
present law is perfect—it is not. But the prohibition represents the 
evolution of a century of wrestling with the subject of political 
activity and charity, and the wisdom that the two are not compatible. 
Such wisdom should not be contravened. 
 
